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“We are all human, we all make mistakes and learn from
them—especially 15 years later—and we all deserve second
chances.”
– HUD Secretary Ben Carson1
Close to fifty years after President Richard Nixon’s 1971 declaration of
a War on Drugs,2 America is attempting to remedy the aftermath. Today, the
War is generally considered a failure.3 Despite all the arrests and
prosecutions, the War has been unsuccessful in accomplishing its two touted
objectives: eliminating drug trafficking and eliminating drug addiction in the
United States.4 America paid dearly; it was extremely expensive,5
disproportionately impacted communities of color,6 and took hundreds of
© 2021 Lahny Silva.
*Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. I would like to extend
a special thanks to my esteemed colleagues at McKinney who continue to inspire, encourage, and
improve my scholarship. Thank you, Professor Eric Miller, for encouraging me to “just say it.”
Thank you, Professors George Wright and Gerard Magliocca, for reviewing drafts of this Article.
Thank you to my family, REACH Team, Thomas Lee Ridley, Professors Carrie Hagan and Joel
Schumm, and all of my REACH kids for the movement. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my
beloved colleague, Professor Florence Roisman. Thank you, Florence, for consistently
emboldening my spirit. And thank you, Young Jeezy and Professor Wright, for the title.
1. Lola Fadulu & Glenn Thrush, Democrats Angered by HUD’s Hiring of Trump Aid Who
Quit After Racist Posts, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/
politics/trump-aide-racism.html (quoting HUD Secretary of State Ben Carson defending his hiring
of former Consumer Financial Protection Bureau official Eric Blankenstein, who quickly resigned
from the post when information was disclosed showing Blankenstein used racial slurs in blog posts
in 2004).
2. Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, PBS FRONTLINE,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited May 26, 2021); Am.
Judicatire Soc’y, It Is Time to End the War on Drugs, 93 JUDICATURE 48, 83 (2009); JILL JONNES,
HEP-CATS, NARCS, AND PIPE DREAMS: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S ROMANCE WITH ILLEGAL
DRUGS 261 (1996); EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER IN
AMERICA 178 (1977).
3. Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: The Continued
Failure
of
the
War
on
Drugs,
CATO INST.
2–3
(Apr.
12,
2017),
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/four-decades-counting-continued-failure-wardrugs; MATTHEW B. ROBINSON & RENEE G. SCHERLEN, LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND DRUG WAR
STATISTICS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS MADE BY THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL POLICY 12 (2007); see Am. Judicature Soc’y, supra note 2; Michael Tonry, Race and the
War on Drugs, 82 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 26 (1994); Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on
America, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 242, 242 (1991).
4. Bruce Bullington & Alan A. Block, A Trojan Horse: Anti-Communism and the War on
Drugs, 14 CONTEMP. CRISES 39 (1990).
5. Coyne & Hall, supra note 3, at 2–3.
6. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82
(1995); Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral
Sentencing Process, 3 CRIM. JUST. 427, 431, 481 (2000).
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thousands of prisoners. This final cost was highlighted when the “the land
of the free” earned the number one spot for having the highest incarceration
rate in the world.7
Recognizing the substantial costs associated with wartime criminal laws
and sentencing practices, a criminal justice reform is currently sweeping
through legislatures across the country.8 In the spirit of fair sentencing and
second chances, legislatures are commissioning studies of sentencing
regimes and modifying criminal penalties with retroactive application.9 The
return of judicial discretion with the United Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Booker10 now allows punishments that deviate from
otherwise strict determinate criminal sentences.11 And clemency is making
a comeback, with both Presidents Obama and Trump utilizing the executive
power to commute overly punitive terms of imprisonment.12 Over 100 days
into his administration, President Biden has not yet made his views clear on
clemency. Ex-offender reentry as a substantive and procedural legal issue is
now considered a legitimate legislative concern, with Congress putting
federal dollars behind evidence-based programs proven to reduce
recidivism.13 States are following suit.14 Although this is a positive step in
undoing decades of ineffective policy, other areas of law impacted by the
Drug War must also be reviewed and modified if the damage caused is to be
truly rectified.
Wartime legislation contributed to the proliferation of not only criminal
statutes and sanctions, but also numerous civil penalties associated with drug-

7. SENTENCIN’G PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1, 2 (last updated
May
2021),
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-USCorrections.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET ].
8. Lucia Bragg, Federal Criminal Justice Reform in 2018, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/federalcriminal-justice-reform-in-2018.aspx.
9. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.); First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 34, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Bragg, supra note
8. Modifying criminal penalties with retroactive application allows individuals to be resentenced
for past crimes according to the current sentencing schema, which changed the penalties associated
with certain drug crimes.
10. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
11. Id. at 245–46.
12. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 811, 837 (2017); Pardons Granted by President Donald J. Trump (2017–2021), U.S. DEP’T
JUST. (last updated Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-presidentdonald-j-trump-2017-2021.
13. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9.
14. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy
Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1308 (2007).
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related suspicion and/or conviction.15 Drug war policies bled over into civil
and administrative areas of law, manifesting in rules that work as a form of
further government control—wreaking havoc on poor, mostly minority
communities that already absorbed the bulk of the War’s attacks on the
criminal front. Commonly referred to as the “collateral consequences of
conviction” in the academic literature, these civil statutes and administrative
regulations are pervasive and pernicious, hindering the transition from prison
to society.16 Collateral consequences affect almost every part of one’s life:
areas that are essential to productive citizenship and socio-economic stability.
As the War seems to be winding down on the criminal front, other rules
continue to endure and serve as the predicate for intensive regulation and
exclusion in civil and administrative matters such as voting, employment,
and housing.
This Article contributes to the existing scholarship on the War on Drugs,
collateral consequences, and offender reentry by reviewing federal criminal
and housing laws in the aftermath of redemptive rhetoric that has been
employed to pronounce a retreat from the War. It applies drug war criticisms
to federal housing policy and argues that the ideological shift away from
“tough on crime” to “second chances” in the criminal context must be
extended to national housing policy. I argue that wartime costs associated
with criminal law are mimicked in the federal housing policy context, a
battleground during the War on Drugs. More specifically, I argue that with
wartime policy deeply penetrating the national housing agenda, the drug laws
continue to serve as a justification to inflict socio-economic violence on
targeted groups. This violence takes the form of intensive regulation in
federal housing programs and operates as an additional layer of
criminalization and social control on an already powerless group.
In neglecting to review wartime policies beyond the criminal law, this
Article contends that policymakers are creating an ideological schism that
has manifested in an inconsistent legislative agenda. There are thus two
systems: one where prisoners of the War are to be viewed as redeemed and
worthy of a second chance, and the other where prisoners of the War continue
15. Rabiah Alicia Burks, Laws Keep Ex-Offenders from Finding Work, Experts Say, LEGAL
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.legalnews.com/oakland/1030871.
16. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1821–31 (2012); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson,
Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 585, 594–99 (2006); see also Christopher Mele & Teresa A.
Miller, Collateral Civil Penalties as Techniques of Social Policy, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 9, 19–20 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005); Jeremy Travis,
Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT : THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 20–22 (Marc Mauer & Meda ChesneyLind eds., 2002).
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to be demonized and excluded from mainstream society. In the criminal
context, the government is pivoting from taking people out of their
communities and incarcerating them to now releasing the legislative pressure
valves to open the prison gates and release prisoners of the War. The question
is: Where will they all live? Housing is identified as the primary barrier for
those reintegrating.17 During this reform movement, legislators are
overlooking collateral consequences affecting housing prospects for criminal
justice-involved individuals, especially drug offenders, thus continuing the
War on the civil front. This Article reasons that the next natural step in the
retreat from the War’s policies is to review and modify Drug War legislation
that transcends criminal law. This is a necessity if the proclaimed political
promise of a second chance is to be truly fulfilled. If it is not, then the
redemptive rhetoric is nothing but a trap—a political ploy used to pander to
public opinion on the criminal justice front, while laying cover to the grave
legislative mistakes made in the shadows on the civil front during the War.
This Article is divided into three primary parts: The Frame, the War,
and the Aftershock. Part I will present a framework to analyze the costs
associated with the War in both criminal law and federal housing policy. 18
This Part will present Drug War criticisms as the lens through which socioeconomic violence caused by wartime federal housing rules ought to be
viewed. In doing so, Part I will offer a new approach to understanding the
breadth and depth of the War on Drugs. Instead of assessing the War as a
battle waged only in the criminal sphere, it should be evaluated as an attack
encompassing all law—the criminal law, as well as civil and administrative
law. In understanding the War as a monolithic effort that bridged both
criminal and civil law, I will evaluate the socio-economic assault on targeted
groups in the housing context arguing that true reform must take a holistic
view of the costs of wartime policy.
Part II will examine the War on Drugs’ criminal law policies, pointing
out signature pieces of legislation enacted during the 1980s,19 to later
demonstrate the recent government changes to this specific legislation.20
This Part will also analyze the War’s influence on federal housing policies
through the review of various statutes that reflect the government’s
aggressive stance on drugs. More specifically, the public housing and
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher and Certificate (“HCV”) programs will
be examined. Housing policy was chosen as the case study because (a)
17. DOUGLAS B. HALL & LISA KOLOVICH, EVALUATION OF THE PRISONER RE-ENTRY
INITIATIVE : FINAL REPORT, DEP’T LABOR EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., 107, tbl IV.19 (2009).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
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federal subsidized housing was a targeted war zone in the War on Drugs21
and (b) research demonstrates that housing currently presents the greatest
barrier to reentry.22 Each section in Part II also will offer an outcomes
assessment of wartime policy in the criminal and housing contexts, with an
emphasis on the failure of the War to accomplish its twin goals of eliminating
drug trafficking and reducing drug abuse.
Part III will assess the retreat from the War on Drugs and the reform of
anti-drug criminal law policies within each of the three branches of
government.23 Like the previous Part, Part III also will review the impact (or
lack thereof) of the criminal justice reforms on housing policy, concluding
that the ideological underpinnings of redemption have yet to penetrate the
national housing agenda, leaving harsh, anti-drug housing legislation on the
books. Finally, Part IV will provide a brief summary of the Article’s thesis.24
In doing so, Part IV reiterates the strong call for review and reform of national
housing policy at all levels and within all branches of government.
I. THE FRAME
“There’s a War goin’on outside no man is safe from.”
– Mobb Deep25
To appreciate the magnitude of the costs associated with the War on
Drugs, it is important to grasp the full scope of the harms that flow from it.
From the bar to the bench, law schools to prisons, and probation departments
to mental health institutions—critics attack. They cite the harshness and
inequality of the criminal laws and the enormous financial expenditures on
prosecutions and corrections.26 Critics also point to the unfairness of the
collateral consequences of criminal convictions and the double tax or penalty
that such rules impose on prisoners once they are released. 27 Scholars and
practitioners alike have provided vital works on collateral consequences in

21. Bernida Reagan, The War on Drugs: A War Against Women, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J.
203, 207 (1990).
22. HALL & KOLOVICH, supra note 17, at 107, tbl IV.19.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. MOBB DEEP, Survival of the Fittest, on THE INFAMOUS (RCA Records 1995).
26. Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2016).
27. Pinard & Thompson, supra note 16, at 594–99; Mele & Miller, supra note 16, at 19–20;
Travis, supra note 16, at 15, 22–23.
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the areas of civil liberties,28 employment,29 and the receipt of public
assistance30 in a broad sense. These arguments together provide a strong
foundation for understanding the need to reform wartime policy and the
prison industrial complex. However, the call for reform must be extended to
the entirety of the social carceral state so that the basic American normative
principles of equality, fairness, and freedom are rewoven into the fabric of
the social order in a way that is inclusive of those given a “second chance.”
The criminal law story of the War is well-documented, voluminous, and, of
course, critical. But the other story of the War—the civil side—offers a more
insidious account and remains the status quo.
The frame that will be used in this Article is an amalgamation of Drug
War critiques centered on the expansion of the enforcement power of the
police and prosecutors. The Drug War critiques include a review of the
economic, social, and racial repercussions associated with wartime policies.
In addition, the concentration on enforcement is perhaps the most significant,
as the greatest discretion in the criminal system is vested in prosecutors and
the police. To show the changes in policy during the War, a review of
legislation is required, followed by an analysis of its impact, which is to be
driven by wartime critiques. To properly situate the housing discussion, this
Article first provides a review of Drug War criminal policy. In applying the
frame to housing policy, this Article examines the expansion of the drug
enforcement powers in the housing context. Here, power was vested not only
in the police but also the public housing authorities. Thus, the War on Drugs
stretched far beyond the four corners of the criminal code and was launched
just as aggressively in other areas of the law.
As will be discussed, the War on Drugs sparked the massive
mobilization of resources against two demonized groups: the drug addict and
the drug dealer. Through legislative fiat, Congress provided manpower,
money, and military machinery to wage a total war against targeted groups
28. See generally JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); see also Chin, supra note 16, at
1821–31.
29. BRUCE WESTERN & BECKY PETTIT, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON
ECONOMIC MOBILITY, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 11 (2010); Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate:
Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155,
165 (2010); Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2003); JEREMY TRAVIS,
AMY L. SOLOMON & MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLIC’Y CTR. 32 (2001),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf.
30. KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 35 (2011); Priscilla Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant:
Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540,
1564 (2012).

572

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:565

and areas suspected of a drug infestation. Total war required that vast
resources be mobilized in both the criminal and civil areas of law. While the
criminal War on Drugs was blasted on television sets and Internet blogs, the
civil War on Drugs was waged in the shadows, with the reverberations from
the bombs felt only by those who lived in war zones. The War’s armies did
not only include law enforcement and prosecutors. They also included
caseworkers and public housing authorities who were charged with holding
the line on the civil and administrative fronts. The interlacing of criminal
law with civil rules created an inescapable web of seemingly endless
minefields that inflicted socio-economic violence on targeted groups through
societal exclusions and denials. Despite the national trend away from the
draconian criminal polices of the War on Drugs, Drug War civil sanctions
continue to render prisoners of the War socially immobile and economically
precarious, particularly in the context of housing.
I do not mean to suggest a direct comparison between criminal drug
laws and federal housing legislation. Of course, there are many distinctions
between the two areas of law. Drug laws and housing regulation trigger two
very different sets of legal processes, with a different set of constitutional
rights, and a different set of government expectations. Violations of drug
laws occur in the form of a criminal prosecution where the government is an
adversary, and the defendant has well-established constitutional rights and
protections during the process. Violations of federal housing rules, by
comparison, occur in an administrative context where the government actor
is first expected to help, and only becomes an adversary when a violation of
program rules occurs. Due process is the only constitutional safeguard in
housing.31
Constitutionally speaking, more is at stake in a drug
prosecution—an individual’s liberty or life. In the housing context, what is
at stake is a government benefit—something an individual is not entitled to
but is given by way of grant from the government. Moreover, the costs are
not exactly parallel. Despite differences, Drug War critiques in the criminal
context offer a set of tools to use in analyzing wartime policies in other
substantive areas of law, such as here in the context of housing.
II. THE WAR
“All warfare is based on deception.”

31. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (explaining “that when welfare is
discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due
process”).
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Sun Tzu32
The War on Drugs is sometimes compared to the Vietnam War.33 Like
Vietnam, America made war, expended thousands of troops, spent millions,
and lost.34 The drug trafficking jungle was foreign territory where enemy
troops engaged in guerilla warfare. And, as with Vietnam, the United States
withdrew from the conflict economically bruised, domestically battered, and
internationally embarrassed.
A. Criminal Policy
“They just tryin’ to jail and chain me, CCA tryin’ to trade me.”
– Derek Minor featuring Tony Tillman & Thi’sl35
The War on Drugs directly targeted “drugs”—possession, use, sale,
manufacture, distribution, and trafficking. The initial objective of drug
policy focused on substantive criminal law and procedure, including the
creation of new drug crimes,36 new and longer criminal sentences for drug
offenses,37 and recidivist statutes that concentrated on prior drug crimes.38
1. Legislation
In 1971, President Richard Nixon proclaimed drug abuse “public enemy
number one” and declared a “[W]ar on [D]rugs.”39 Despite the brief reprieve
during the administrations of Presidents Ford and Carter,40 President Reagan
continued the War in the 1980s with a rejuvenated commitment to

32. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 6 (Lionel Giles trans., Luzac & Co. 1910).
33. Then-Senator Joe Biden also compared the War on Drugs to the Vietnam War. See W.
John Moore, “Ducking the Truth at Home,” NAT’L J., Sept. 16, 1998, at 2291.
34. Id.
35. DEREK MINOR, TONY T ILLMAN & THI’SL, God Bless the Trap, on THE TRAP (Reach
Records 2018).
36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 960(b).
37. Id. § 841(b); Alyssa L. Beaver, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming the
Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2534 (2010);
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 21 U.S.C.); DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, CRACKS IN
THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW, AM. C.L. UNION
11 (2006), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf.
38. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37.
39. Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, supra note 2.
40. David Schultz, Rethinking Drug Criminalization Policies, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 151, 165
(1993).
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eliminating the twin enemies of drug addiction and drug trafficking.41 In
total, the War was fought for almost four decades 42 and, irrespective of
partisan affiliation, every president has engaged in the War in some form or
another.43 To date, the War accomplished nothing; drug use and trafficking
have remained constant since the 1970s.44
Three major pieces of anti-drug legislation were enacted during
Reagan’s presidency that formed the bedrock of the War on Drugs criminal
policy: (1) the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which included
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,45 (2) the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,46
and (3) the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.47 The legislation was
meant to reduce drug abuse and trafficking,48 with the underlying justification
being the protection of society and the individual.49 But while the legislation
was being drafted, “debated,” and enacted, the data indicated that drug use
peaked in the 1970s and decreased steadily through 1984.50 Public officials
and scholars alike were well aware of this decline when the War started,51
and later a 1988 Pentagon report concluded that, “[i]ncreased drug
interdiction efforts [were] not likely to greatly affect the availability of
cocaine in the United States.”52 Despite this information, the War raged on
and continued through the 2000s.
1.1. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, enacted on October 12,
1984 with an eleventh hour Congressional move to overhaul the federal code,

41. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 266 (3d ed.
1999).
42. Am. Judicature Soc’y., supra note 2, at 83.
43. ROBINSON & SCHERLEN, supra note 3, at 28.
44. Claire Suddath, Brief History: The War on Drugs, TIME (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html.
45. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
46. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 and 21 U.S.C.).
47. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37.
48. Tonry, supra note 3, at 26.
49. Bandow, supra note 3, at 244.
50. 132 CONG. REC. S26441 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Daniel J. Evans);
BUREAU JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—1993, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
457 (1993); Tonry, supra note 3, at 26, 36 (citing OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
(“ONDCP”), PRICE AND PURITY OF COCAINE 29 (1992)). See also Tonry, supra note 3, at 36.
51. Tonry, supra note 3, at 36.
52. PETER REUTER, GORDON CRAWFORD & JOHNATHAN CAVE, SEALING THE BORDERS: THE
EFFECTS OF INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG INTERDICTION, RAND xi (1988).
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was the first major piece of anti-drug legislation.53 The Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984,54 a major component of the new legislation, was one of the most
prominent features of the new legislation—and it was harsh and pervasive.55
The engineer of this new legislation was also its primary beneficiary: the
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”).56
The Act made a number of changes to the federal code. It created new
federal penalties for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute and distribution within 1,000 feet of a school zone,57 as well as
importation.58 The U.S. Parole Commission and the federal parole system
were also abolished.59
Congress statutorily authorized the use of civil forfeiture, allowing the
government to “seize” and liquidate private property that was involved in or
related to drug trafficking with the purpose of eliminating the profits of drug
traffickers.60 Prior to the enactment of the Crime Control Act, Title 21
authorized the use of civil forfeiture of real property, including leasehold
interests, when that property was used to commit or facilitate criminal
offenses.61 The Act amended Title 21 to specifically and explicitly authorize
the civil forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug transactions.62

53. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, supra note 45; John C. Cleary & Alan Ellis,
An Overview of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 31 PRAC. LAW. 31, 31–32 (1985).
54. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). The provision creating the United States Sentencing
Commission became effective on October 12, 1984. The United States Sentencing Commission
was and remains comprised of seven voting members and one nonvoting member. After consulting
with law enforcement and defense attorneys and with the approval of the Senate, the President will
appoint the voting members of the Sentencing Commission, which will serve staggered six-year
terms.
55. Cleary & Ellis, supra note 53, at 32.
56. Id.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). “”
58. Id. §§ 841(b), 960(b).
59. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supra note 54, § 218(a)(5) (repealing 18
U.S.C. §§ 4201–218).
60. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, supra note 45, 1837 Stat. at 2047;
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040 (codified at
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961). With civil forfeiture, the property vests in the United States at the
time of the crime. Innocent bona fide purchasers may petition the court for relief. Forfeiture is
mandatory upon conviction.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (providing for forfeiture of “real property, including any right, title,
and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land . . . which is
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation”).
62. Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904).
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The Act also included a major overhaul to the federal criminal
sentencing structure. With the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“Sentencing
Act”) embedded, the new legislation created the United States Sentencing
Commission (“Sentencing Commission”), an independent commission
within the Judicial Branch.63 The Sentencing Commission was mandated to
draft and file a set of sentencing guidelines (“Guidelines”) by April of 1986.64
The Guidelines established specific parameters to determine criminal
sentences in the federal courts and severely restricted the discretion of federal
sentencing judges.65
1.2. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
In 1986, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“1986
Act”), which is best known for its crack cocaine provision (alternatively
known as the 100:1 powder to crack cocaine ratio). The 1986 Act amended
the Controlled Substances Act of 197066—the original legislation that
established federal drug policy and more specifically laid out the controlled
substances schedules.67 The 1986 Act instructed federal courts to implement
the 100:1 ratio at sentencing.68 Thus, the same five-year mandatory
minimum prison sentence was imposed for offenses involving five grams of
crack or five hundred grams of cocaine.69 The congressional justifications
supporting the enactment of the ratio included the addictive properties of
crack, the threat to children and the unborn in utero, as well as the low cost
of the drug.70 Ironically, as the government intensified law enforcement
energies, more children became drug dealers, with some suggesting that the
very “illegality of drugs makes them more attractive to children.” 71
What has been secreted away is that Congress enacted this legislation
based in large part on testimony from a well-known and well respected
District of Columbia prosecutor, Johnny St. Valentine Brown, who was later
convicted of perjury when a defense attorney exposed that Brown lied about

63. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supra note 54.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1984); Cleary & Ellis, supra note 53, at 36.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1984). With this, the Sentencing Commission directed that there be no
more than a twenty-five percent difference between the minimum and maximum criminal sentence
for a particular offense. Only fifteen percent of the total incarceration term was allowed for “good
time” credits and industrial credits were eliminated. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).
66. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, supra note 62; id. § 202 (providing the controlled
substances schedules).
67. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, supra note 46.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006); Beaver, supra note 37, at 2533.
69. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006); Beaver, supra note 37, at 2533.
70. VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 37, at 2.
71. Bandow, supra note 3, at 248 (emphasis omitted).
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his “expert” credentials.72 Based on his “independent research,” Brown
testified before Congress that, “possession of twenty grams of crack cocaine
was just as dangerous as having one thousand grams of powder cocaine.”73
Enter the 100:1 ratio74 and exit Brown. After twenty years of testifying in
various trials, Brown was indicted on perjury charges, pled guilty, and was
sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment.75
The 1986 Act further authorized enormous federal expenditures with
$1.1 billion allocated to law enforcement agencies.76 Substance abuse
treatment was assigned $675 million for recovery programs.77 Prevention
initiatives were given $80 million.78 The budget demonstrated that the
federal government was more dedicated to investigation, indictment, and
incarceration and less committed to preventing and treating the disease of
addiction. By the end of President Reagan’s tenure, only 3% of the
population regarded drug use as the most important problem the country was
facing.79
1.3. The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The final piece of legislation was the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 (“1988 Act”).80 The 1988 Act formulated the policy for a drug free
America and created the Office of Drug Control Policy. 81 The White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy (“ONDCP”) stressed that law
enforcement efforts should be given primary import and every year insisted
that there be a 70-30 split of federal funding in favor of law enforcement.82
By the time drug czar Bill Bennett was appointed by President George H.W.
Bush in 1989, federal expenditures for “consequences and confrontation”

72. Beaver, supra note 37, at, 2533–34.
73. Id. at 2534 (citing Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws—The Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 166–73 (2007) (statement of
Eric. E. Sterling, President, Crim. Just. Pol’y Found.)).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Bill Miller, Challenges Planned After ‘Expert’ Resigns, WASH. POST, Oct. 11,
1999, at B2).
76. Joel Brinkley, Anti-Drug Law: Words, Deed, Political Expediency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/27/us/anti-drug-law-words-deeds-political-expediency
.html.
77. 132 CONG. REC. S26461 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Broyhill).
78. Id. at 26451–52 (statement of Sen. Abdnor).
79. Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use in American
Politics, 41 SOC. PROBS. 425, 425 (1994).
80. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 37.
81. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 1002.
82. Tonry, supra note 3, at 25 (citing ONDCP 1990 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY—
BUDGET SUMMARY 100 (1990)).
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was $12 billion.83 A chunk of this was spent on high-priced weaponry
including fighter jets and Navy submarines.84 With its laser focus on law
enforcement, ONDCP consistently snubbed the treatment approach even
though it was “known that tens of thousands of drug users in cities wanted
but could not gain admission to treatment programs.”85 In addition, Congress
appropriated $200 million to build and equip new prison facilities so as “to
alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons and to meet the increased demand
for prison space resulting from drug-related offenses.”86 In the first ten years
of its life, ONDCP failed to achieve drug war goals with studies
demonstrating that expenditures outweighed any realized benefits.87
Perhaps more importantly, the 1988 Act mounted a further aggressive
assault against crack offenders.88 The legislation established a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment of five years for simple possession of five
grams or more of crack.89 The maximum penalty was set at a twenty-year
term. In contrast, the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for all other
drugs was one year.90 Moreover, the 1988 Act authorized a term of life
imprisonment for a three-time recidivist drug offender.91 Individuals with
two or more prior felony drug convictions were statutorily required to serve
life imprisonment without the possibility of release.92 Now, repeat drug
offenders could be held prisoner forever—literally.
Finally, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 revisited civil forfeiture and
once again amended Title 21 to clarify that real property seized in connection
with facilitating a drug transaction included leasehold interests.93 This statute
remains in effect. With this, civil forfeiture fell into three main categories:
(1) the drugs may be forfeited, (2) the money or tangibles purchased with
drug money may be forfeited, and (3) the real property and leasehold interests
that are used in commission of the offense may be forfeited.94 The
83. Am. Judicature Soc’y., supra note 2, at 48, 83.
84. Id.
85. Tonry, supra note 3, at 25.
86. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 6157.
87. ROBINSON & SCHERLEN, supra note 3, at 202.
88. Brinkley, supra note 76.
89. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 6371.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 6452.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 5104 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)).
94. Kevin Cole, Civilizing Civil Forfeiture, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 249, 250 (1996). See,
e.g., Pamela Brown, Parents’ house seized after son’s drug bust, CNN (September 8, 2014, 10:45
AM) (detailing a situation where parents, never convicted of a crime, were forced out of their home
in Philadelphia based on their son’s criminal drug charges (for having $40 worth of heroin) and
highlighting that over 500 homes and cars in Philadelphia were seized in a two-year period in
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government is authorized to seize the property if issued a warrant pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which requires an ex parte judicial
determination of probable cause.95 Law enforcement is thus permitted to
seize assets and property from people who are not criminally prosecuted if
the property itself is suspected of involvement in criminal activity.96 This
occurs even if the property owner is not charged with the predicate offense.97
Moreover, there are no particular procedural rules governing the process.98
The use of civil forfeiture, as a practice in criminal prosecutions,
evolved into a substantial component of drug enforcement strategy in the late
1990s.99 Property was “seized and sold with the profits flowing to law
enforcement budgets.”100 The War integrated the confiscation of homes,
including those of innocent people accused of having a substance-abusing
relative.101 Between September 2001 and September 2014, the DOJ’s
equitable sharing program was responsible for nearly 62,000 seizures of cash
without warrants or criminal indictments filed against owners. Of the $2.5
billion forfeited as a result, state and local agencies received $1.7 billion and
federal agencies received $800 million. 102 Aside from the arbitrariness of
civil forfeiture, the deeper issue was and continues to be that the process
incentivizes the practice without any accountability or oversight.103 With the
legal action considered “civil,” claimants are without a constitutional right to
counsel. And without an attorney, indigent claimants are at a “severe
disadvantage.”104

forfeiture
proceedings),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/03/us/philadelphia-drug-bust-houseseizure.
95. United States v. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
96. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881; Rishi Batra, Resolving Civil Forfeiture Disputes, 66 U. KAN. L.
REV. 399, 401 (2017).
97. Batra, supra note 96.
98. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 507.
99. Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 889, 889–94 (1987).
100. Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV. 839, 842–43
(2002) (citing William Patrick Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable
Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture,
80 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1309–13 (1992)).
101. United States v. $46,588.00 in U.S. Currency and $20.00 in Canadian Currency, 103 F.3d
902, 903 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and Seize:
Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes,
WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stopand-seize/. The DOJ’s program permits local enforcement to share in the proceeds of property
seized through civil forfeiture.
103. Boyd, supra note 100.
104. Batra, supra note 96, at 412–13.
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The War on Drugs overhaul to the federal criminal code culminated in
a “no mercy” criminal justice policy for drug offenders—and only drug
offenders. Hard-hitting law enforcement efforts were statutorily authorized
not to just investigate suspected drug offenders, but to hunt them, especially
if they were suspected crack offenders. Backed by billions of dollars in
federal funding and resources, law enforcement officers attacked entire
communities and social networks in search of the wicked drug offender.
Despite studies reporting a decline in drug abuse and the ineffectiveness of
supply-side enforcement, Congress continued its focus on drugs and drug
offenders.105 The law also placed federal judges in a sentencing straitjacket,
providing little wiggle room to make appropriate adjustments where fairness
and justice would otherwise require. The War on Drugs policies, coupled
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, stripped judges of sufficient
discretion to consider individual circumstances when sentencing federal
defendants. With this, long and often unnecessary terms of imprisonment
were imposed.
2. Repercussions
The War’s anti-drug criminal legislation offered, in vain, billions of
dollars to support federal and state efforts to eradicate drugs. The supplyside approach, with its emphasis on aggressive drug enforcement, may have
actually produced more social damage and violence than it helped.106 With
2.2 million people in the nation’s prisons and jails, a 500% increase over the
last forty years, the United States was named the world’s top jailer in 2009—
imprisoning the greatest proportion of its population relative to every other
country in the world.107 Moreover, by 2011, approximately 6.98 million
people in the United States were serving a term of federal or state correctional
supervision.108 Despite the recent decline in U.S. rates of imprisonment,
incarceration rates are not slated to decline to 1980 levels for almost ninety
years.109 The War on Drugs was a legislative design meant to increase the

105. Supply-side enforcement focuses on the drug supply by targeting the sources of supply
(manufacturers, distributors, suppliers), compared to demand-side policies, which focus on the
demand for the drugs by targeting addiction and treatment services.
106. Batra, supra note 96, at 412–13.
107. FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 1, 2; E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011,
BUREAU JUST. STATS. 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
108. Lauren E. Glaze & Erika Parks, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2011,
BUREAU JUST. STATS. 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf.
109. Marc Mauer & Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Can We Wait 88 Years to End Mass Incarceration?
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/88-years-massincarceration_b_4474132.
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power of the prosecutor and reduce the discretion of the courts. The result
was a system of over-prosecution and mass incarceration.
Prosecutorial power over the criminal process grew during the War on
Drugs, along with a 160% increase of people arrested for drug crimes
between 1980 and 1989.110 Mandatory minimums greatly expanded
prosecutorial influence, thus changing the balance of power in drug
prosecutions.111 Plea bargains could be all but forced upon defendants.112
With the threat of sentencing enhancements based on recidivist offender
designations (such as armed career criminal) possibly resulting in a life
sentence,113 a plea was all but guaranteed.114 Between 1980 and 1996, there
was almost a tenfold increase in drug convictions nationwide.115 In the
federal system, there was almost a twentyfold increase of offenders
imprisoned for drug offenses between 1980 and 2007.116 The War on Drugs
more than doubled the American prison population between 1981 and
1990.117 In 1996, the prison population tripled, with research suggesting this
was both due to a greater proclivity to arrest and the practice of imposing
longer prison sentences.118 By 1997, 60% of federal prisoners were drug
offenders.119
The courts offered little relief to criminal defendants challenging the
power of the drug enforcement machine. With the statutorily-sanctioned
expansion of police power and increased prosecutorial control over the
criminal process, the courts provided little constitutional cover for drug
defendants. Instead, drug policy seemed to dictate not only criminal law and
110. Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and
the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 288–89 (2010).
111. Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an
Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 137–38 (1995).
112. Id.
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); T.J. Matthes, The Armed Career Criminal Act: A Severe Implication
Without Explanation, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 591, 592–94 (2015).
114. Morvillo & Bohrer, supra note 111, at 137–38.
115. Fareed Zakaria, Incarceration Nation: The war on drugs has succeeded only in putting
millions of Americans in jail, TIME (Apr. 2, 2012), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,2109777,00.html.
116. See Sentencing Memorandum of Myles Haynes at 10, United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp.
2d 200 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 06-10328), 2006 WL 5283198, at *10.
117. Number of Inmates in U.S. Reaches Record, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1990),
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/08/us/number-of-inmates-in-us-reaches-record.html (reporting
a jump from 344,283 inmates in 1981 to 755,425 inmates in 1990).
118. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in the U.S. Prisons 1980–1996, in
PRISONS 17, 43 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds. 1999) (noting the breakdown as follows: 51%
increase attributed to a proclivity to incarcerate upon arrest and 37% increase attributed to longer
sentences of imprisonment).
119. Lisa Rosenblum, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
1217, 1230–31 (2002).
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procedure but also the parameters of constitutional protections guaranteed to
the American people.120 Cases granted certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court often pronounced rules departing from longstanding
interpretations of Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.121
With the Burger and Rehnquist courts reigning during the height of the War,
civil rights and freedoms were severely restricted.122 In a series of drug cases,
the Court gave the police great power and deference. Law enforcement was
now constitutionally permitted to search your trash,123 your farm,124 and your
car125 without a warrant and sometimes without probable cause. As a
detection tool, the police could use a drug dog in almost every
circumstance,126 and warrantless surveillance could be conducted via
helicopter,127 plane,128 and beeper.129 When criminal defendants levied racebased challenges, the Court all but looked away. In Whren v. United
States,130 the petitioner claimed racial profiling under the Fourth Amendment
and the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment was the wrong

120. Id. at 1228; see also Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
121. John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the
Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 580–82 (1991).
122. Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger Is Dead at 87; Was Chief Justice for 17 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, (June 26, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/26/obituaries/warren-e-burger-is-deadat-87-was-chief-justice-for-17-years.html.
123. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of a discarded trash bag left at the curb for a third-party
disposal).
124. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (establishing a four-pronged test for
curtilage and finding that a barn, fifty yards from the fence that enclosed the home, did not constitute
curtilage for Fourth Amendment purposes); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding
that there is no expectation of privacy in open fields).
125. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that where the police have
probable cause to suspect the presence of contraband, police may search the containers in an
automobile without a warrant).
126. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983) (holding that a canine sniff of the exterior
of a luggage bad did not constitute a search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding
that a canine sniff of a car during a lawful traffic stop, without a warrant, did not constitute a search).
127. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy
in the warrantless observation by law enforcement that occurred in a helicopter flying at 400 feet
by naked-eye observation and in a physically nonintrusive manner).
128. California v. Ciarolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding that there is no expectation of
privacy in the warrantless observation by law enforcement that occurred in an airplane in public
navigable airspace by naked-eye observation and in a physically nonintrusive manner).
129. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that the warrantless monitoring
of an individual’s movements with an electronic beeper was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (holding that the warrantless
monitoring of an individual’s movements with an electronic beeper was not a search).
130. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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constitutional vehicle to allege race-based complaints.131 Instead, petitioners
would have to make an equal protection claim.132 When a race-based claim
of selective prosecution was made in United States v. Armstrong,133 the Court
crafted an insurmountable test to make such a showing. 134 In handing down
these opinions, the Court pushed the War agenda forward, thus giving the
drug enforcement machine the green light to continue to attack and wreak
havoc on communities of color.
The repercussions of wartime criminal policy on targeted groups are
vast, however drug war critics focus primarily on three categories of costs:
(1) financial expenditures, (2) social disruption, and (3) race-based targeting.
In accordance with wartime legislation, drug enforcement efforts were fully
funded. As mentioned above, Congress allocated billions of dollars annually
to law enforcement agencies in its effort to combat drug use and trafficking.
By 1991, federal expenditures were at $10.5 billion, a 64% increase since the
presidential administration of George H.W. Bush began in 1989.135 Requests
for funding continued to increase, with appeals for additional funding in 1992
coming in at $11.7 billion.136 In addition to financial expenditures, Congress
authorized the transfer of excess military equipment to state and local law
enforcement agencies.137 And if the resources allocated were not enough,
drug-related civil forfeiture actions offered an additional pool of funding.
Armed with military-grade equipment and seemingly unlimited financial
resources, the drug enforcement machine was able to launch a Spartan attack.
Corrections expenditures also skyrocketed. Between 1982 and 2001,
state corrections expenditures increased annually from $15 billion to $53.5
billion, and fluctuated between 2002 and 2010.138 The largest allocation of
funding between 1982 and 2010 was for institutions, including prisons and
work release facilities.139 During this time, the operational expenditures per
131. Id. at 813.
132. Id.
133. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
134. Id. at 458. The Court required a high standard of proof to establish a prima facie showing
entitling a defendant to discovery on the issue of selective prosecution. The test required a defendant
make a “threshold showing . . . that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated
suspects of other races.” Id.
135. DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 329–30 (Steven R.
Belenko ed., 2000) [hereinafter DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA].
136. Id.
137. Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Keep off the Grass: The
Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy, 91 OR. L. REV. 1069, 1087 (2013); see also
RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE
FORCES 242–308 (2013).
138. Tracey Kyckelhahn, State Corrections Expenditures, FY 1982–2010, BUREAU JUST.
STATS., 1 (last updated Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scefy8210.pdf.
139. Id.
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inmate in a state or private prison at the 25th percentile was between $21,243
and $26,452, and between $37,084 and $43,178 at the 75th percentile.140
However, expenditures started to dip under $30,000 per inmate annually
around 2004 and continue to decline.141 Parole, probation, nonresidential
halfway houses, and costs associated with administration (considered
noninstitutional corrections) comprised 20.4% and 27.3% of total corrections
outlays and ranged from $3.8 billion to $12.9 billion.142
The social costs associated with the incarceration aspect of the War are
substantial.143 Mass incarceration disrupts the social order144 and destabilizes
communities.145 Such harms include family interruption, diminished socioeconomic status, disenfranchisement, and increased risk of recidivism.146
Poverty and lack of opportunity are associated with higher crime rates;
crime leads to arrest, a criminal record, and usually a jail or prison sentence;
a history of past crimes lengthens those sentences; offenders released from
prison or jail confront family and neighborhood dysfunction, increased risks
of unemployment, and other-producing disadvantages; this makes them
likelier to commit new crimes, and the cycle repeats itself.147
High rates of imprisonment are geographically clustered in “hot spots”
that are predicted by social factors correlated to urban disadvantage—
poverty, unemployment, family disruption, and racial seclusion.148 These
communities overwhelmingly bear the burdens associated with
imprisonment and are not safer, with data suggesting a “tipping point when
incarceration becomes so heavily concentrated in disadvantaged
communities that it works against the safety and well-being of that
community.”149 Sociological studies report that these communities are

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 2.
JENNI GAINSBOROUGH & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DIMINISHING
RETURNS: CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE 1990S’ 25 (2000).
144. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1285 (2004).
145. Id. at 1282; Todd R. Clear, The Problem with “Addition by Subtraction”: The Prison-Crime
Relationship in Low Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 181, 183 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds.,
2002).
146. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 439 (2013).
147. Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s
Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 263 (2009).
148. Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: The Local Concentration of
Mass Incarceration, 139 DAEDALUS 20, 21–22 (2010).
149. Traum, supra note 146, at 435.
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considerably damaged when those released from prison return with reduced
political, economic, and social opportunities and status.150
The racial impact of the War is very real and shown by the statistics.
Arrest rates exploded, with minority populations bearing the brunt of the drug
policies.151 Between 1980 and 2009, the Black arrest rate rose 205% while
the white arrest rate increased 102%. 152 More specifically, arrest rates for
sale and/or manufacture for Black individuals rose 363% between 1980 and
1989, while the arrest rates for white individuals increased 127%. 153 The
incarceration rate tells a similar story. More than 60% of the imprisoned
population is comprised of people of color.154 Black men are six times and
Hispanic men are 2.7 times more likely than their white counterparts to be
incarcerated.155 On any given day, approximately one in every twelve Black
men in his thirties is incarcerated. 156 America, the land of the free, is
imprisoning “the same number of African-American men as were enslaved
in 1820.”157 For many Black men, the risk of incarceration is a normal event
in one’s life.158
The researched explanation for the racial impact is also disheartening,
with scholars concluding that the War was partially inspired by racism.159 In
2010, James Unnever and Francis Cullen reported the “prominent reason” for
the harshness of the United States justice system “is the belief that those
disproportionately subject to these harsh sanctions are people they do not
like: African American offenders.”160 The very architecture of wartime
150. Id. at 434–35 (“While one family can bear the strain of a family member’s imprisonment
by relying on ‘networks of kin and friends,’ multiple families relying on the same network
eventually strain and weaken the community.”) (citing Roberts, supra note 144, at 1282).
151. See DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 135, at 334.
152. Snyder, supra note 110 at 13 (referencing Figure 40).
153. Id. (referencing Figure 44).
154. FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Boyd, supra note 100, at 846 (citing Jan M. Chaiken, Crunching Numbers: Crime and
Incarceration at the End of the Millennium, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., 14 (2000)).
158. Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW
YORKER 72 (Jan. 22, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-ofamerica. See also Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass
Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 221, 231 (2009) (finding that one in eight
Black men in their twenties is in prison or jail on any given day, and 69% of Black high school
dropouts are imprisoned over their lifetime, compared with just 15% for white high school
dropouts).
159. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE
REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 51–52 (2014); James D. Unnever &
Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americas’ Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing
Models, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 119 (2010).
160. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 159, at 119.
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policy suggests race-based policies. Take, for example, the crack-to-powder
ratio.161 Crack, a drug associated with poor Black people, was punished 100
times more harshly than powder cocaine, a drug associated with wealthy
white people.162 With this, Congress made a deliberate choice to punish
Black defendants more harshly than white defendants.163 Critics lament that
the War’s legislation, meant to eradicate drug abuse and trafficking, was used
to control communities of color by removing the target: the men.164 The
wartime machine targeted, arrested, and imprisoned disproportionate
numbers of Black and Latino men. The statistics bear out an incorrigible
reality: the War on Drugs resulted in the creation of a separate
“demographically distinct underclass” comprised primarily of men of color
now excludable from mainstream society based on the drug felon label. 165
This societal exclusion has thus left this demographic vulnerable to the War’s
continued violence in the civil and administrative spheres.
The War on Drugs was a miserable failure. The strategy—attacking the
supply side of the drug problem—was doomed from the start. The success
rate of drug seizures at both the state and federal levels has remained constant
since the 1960s—10%.166 Despite the billions of dollars expended, the War
did nothing to slow the flow of illegal narcotics in and around the United
States.167 The “replacement effect,” where imprisoned drug dealers are
replaced by others willing to assume the risk, proved to be a major
impediment to the supply-side tactic.168 Imprisoning “foot soldiers and drug
users in gangs has a negligible impact on crime,”169 particularly on drug use
and associated violence.170 In the end, the War on Drugs accomplished
neither of its twin objectives of combatting drug abuse and ending drug
trafficking.171

161. Levin, supra note 26, at 2181.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2183–84.
165. Id. at 2180.
166. See Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 292 (2015) (citing
Harry Hermans, War on Drugs, DRUG TEXT (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.drugtest.org/Internationalnational-drug-policy/war-on-drugs.html).
167. Id. at 273.
168. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 19
(2009),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_
32609.pdf; David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism,
30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 698 (2003); Tonry, supra note 3, at 26.
169. Baradaran, supra note 166, at 294 (citing Rasmussen & Benson, supra note 168, at 705).
170. Tracey L. Meares, It’s a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 587–89 (1997).
171. David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 36
(2011).
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As the War on Drugs policies and practices swept across state criminal
codes, other areas of law were reviewed, amended, and modified to reflect
the anti-drug sentiment that captured the country. Drug policy crept into a
number of state and federal statutes and regulations on employment, public
benefit eligibility, and housing policy. The collateral consequences of being
a prisoner of war was that you continued to be a target in the shadows where
the War was being waged on the civil side.172

172. Travis, supra note 16, at 15–19; see also Chin, supra note 16, at 1790–92.
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B. Housing Policy
“Cops patrol projects
Hatin’ the people livin’ in ‘em
I was born an inmate
Waitin’ to escape the prison”
– Tupac & The Outlawz173
The extension of Drug War policy into civil and administrative law,
dubbed the “New Jim Crow” by Michelle Alexander174 and the “New Civil
Death” by Gabriel Chin,175 continued the War’s devastation on poor
communities of color. The marriage of criminal drug policy with welfare
during the War led to the expansion of legislatively demarcated war zones.176
Beginning with Ronald Reagan, public assistance recipients were added to
the list of targeted groups that eventually culminated in an all-out assault on
poor minority communities.177 In the context of housing, the War was
particularly destructive, as it took more prisoners than just the individual
offender. In crafting wartime strategy, policymakers took specific aim at
poor housing communities, thus capturing a secondary group of prisoners in
the drug enforcement net: the family, friends, and associates of those
suspected of drug-related criminal activity. Housing subsidy recipients were
targeted and criminalized.178
1. Legislation
To relieve the nation’s housing pressures and ensure “safe and
affordable housing” during the Great Depression, the federal government
intervened in the name of promoting the “general welfare.”179 With this,
173. TUPAC & THE OUTLAWZ, Black Jesuz, on STILL I RISE (Death Row Records 1999).
174. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
175. Chin, supra note 16.
176. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1564.
177. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1564.
178. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1564.
179. Alex Markels, Comparing Today’s Housing Crisis with the 1930s: Home prices have fallen
and construction stalled, but the Great Depression was twice as bad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT.
(Feb.
28,
2008),
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/realestate/articles/2008/02/28/comparing-todays-housing-crisis-with-the-1930s. This includes The
National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 84–345, 48 Stat. 847, enacted June 28, 1934, also called
the Capehart Act, and the United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75–412, 50 Stat. 888,
enacted September 1, 1937. “[T]he goal of providing decent and affordable housing for all citizens
through the efforts and encouragement of Federal, State, and local governments, and by the
independent and collective actions of private citizens, organizations, and the private sector.” 42
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federal housing policy evolved into a system of federal subsidization.180 It
has since mutated from public housing to private market vouchers to an
underfunded program with millions of federally subsidized units
disappearing from the housing market.181
The War on Drugs’ influence on federal housing policy resulted in the
targeting of “drugs” in both admission and termination rules and procedure.
Taken together, four pieces of legislation form the basis of the War’s antidrug policy in housing: (1) the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,182 (2) the
National Affordable Housing Act of 1990,183 (3) the Housing Opportunity
Program Extension Act of 1996,184 and (4) the Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998. 185 Despite the second chance revolution
occurring in the criminal law context, federal housing policy remains
entrenched in the strict exclusionary policies of the War.
The seeds that fused criminal drug policy with welfare reform were in
the public imagination early in the War. But the foundation for this
amalgamation was laid in the public consciousness generations prior and was
woven throughout our nation’s history. From the early days of the republic,
crime and race have been definitively linked in the American psyche.186 In
the 1970s, a third prong gradually developed that merged welfare
dependency with race and crime.

U.S.C. § 1437(a)(4). This principle was reiterated in the 1990 Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act. The Act stated that the housing goals of America continue to be committed “to decent,
safe, and sanitary housing for every American.” Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 503, 104 Stat. 4079, 4085.
180. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75–412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). “[T]he goal of providing decent and affordable housing for all
citizens through the efforts and encouragement of Federal, State, and local governments, and by the
independent and collective actions of private citizens, organizations, and the private sector.” 42
U.S.C. § 1437(a)(4). This principle was reiterated in the 1990 Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act. The Act stated that the housing goals of America continue to be committed “to decent,
safe, and sanitary housing for every American.” Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act of 1990, supra note 179, § 503.
181. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (creating the “Section 8 Housing Certificate
program” in 1974, which was the precursor to the current “Housing Choice Voucher Program”
(“HCV”)); JENNIFER WOLCH, MICHAEL DEAR, GARY BLASI, DAN FLAMING, PAUL TEPPER, PAUL
KOEGEL & DANIEL WARSHAWSKY, ENDING HOMELESSNESS IN LOS ANGELES 6 (2007).
182. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37.
183. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, supra note 179.
184. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
185. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat.
2461, Title V (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
186. PUBLIC HOUSING MYTHS: PERCEPTION, REALITY, AND SOCIAL POLICY 64–65 (Nicholas
Dagen Bloom, Fritz Umbach & Lawrence J. Vale eds., 2015).
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In the 1960s and 1970s, sociologists studying then existing social
policies, such as William Julius Wilson, wrote about the swelling of “the
underclass.”187 Wilson defined the underclass as “the most disadvantaged
segment[] of the black urban community.”188 He further described this group
as,
individuals who lack training and skills and either experience longterm unemployment or are not members of the labor force,
individuals who are engaged in street crime and other forms of
aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of
poverty and/or welfare dependency.189
The unification of race, crime, and welfare in the sociological literature
supported a conservative political agenda with evidence steeped in the
behavioral sciences. To add fuel, the sociopolitical climate was becoming
saturated with reactionary calls to civil rights progress. With this, welfare
and federal housing programs became a natural focal point during the War.
The presidential administrations of the 1980s and 1990s capitalized on this
trifecta for campaign points and policy initiatives.
In his 1980 bid for president, Ronald Reagan relentlessly condemned
two targets: drug offenders and so-called welfare queens.190 Reagan’s
“welfare queen” provided the perfect propaganda to demonize and
criminalize the welfare system. The welfare queen, characterized as a poor
Black woman “working” the welfare system, walked hand-in-hand with the
drug addict and street dealer. The welfare queen was the mother, sister,
grandmother, wife, or girlfriend of the drug offender. The political narrative
painted a picture that linked the two groups as threats to the social order.
While the drug offender threatened to morally bankrupt the American people
with trafficking and addiction, the welfare queen threatened to financially
bankrupt the American budget by cheating taxpayers through welfare
fraud.191 Poor women, especially Black women, were classified as criminals.
This criminalization was generated through the stereotype of the welfare
queen as a lazy fraudster who refused to work.192 Just as important, the
welfare queen was seen as an “incubator[] of criminal activity”—through her
children.193 She decided to have more and more children out of wedlock to
187. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (2d ed. 2012).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30.
191. Id.
192. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 643,
650–51 (2009); Ocen, supra note 30, at 1562.
193. Ocen, supra note 30, at 1562.
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increase her public benefits, as opposed to working and getting married.194
Americans viewed welfare as a Black program that rewarded laziness. 195
Both groups were thus presented as public enemies deserving of tough
punishments.
1.1. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The manifestation of this political sentiment was first statutorily
expressed in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which was an important
amendment to the existing United States Housing Act of 1937.196 The last
major piece of federal anti-drug criminal legislation, the 1988 Act started the
spillover of the War’s policies into the housing realm. The first shots in the
anti-drug offensive on national housing policy were fired.
In the 1988 Act, Congress made a number of findings, including that
drug dealers were “imposing a reign of terror” on federal housing program
tenants and that drug-related crime was “rampant” in federal housing
projects, leading to violence.197 In furthering laying the groundwork,
Congress created a clearinghouse on drug abuse in public housing and
training programs for public housing officials confronting drugs on their
property.198 The congressional findings declared war on drug dealers
utilizing federal housing programs. The clearinghouse served as the center
for drug related intelligence. And the training programs provided a planning
stage to craft strategies from which to launch an assault.
In terms of tenancies, drug-related criminal activity was made a federal
statutory basis for termination from public housing. With Congressional
findings that drug crimes were “rampant” in public housing projects, the
focus of this amendment was the eradication of drugs from federal housing
programs.199 Public housing tenants, or other persons under the tenants’
control suspected of “drug-related criminal activity, on or near” a public

194. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30.
195. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 3, 60–61 (1993).
196. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5101 (amending the United States Housing
Act of 1937).
197. Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5122, 102 Stat. 4181,
4301 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11901); Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act of 1990, supra note 179, § 581(a); Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, supra
note 185, § 586(b).
198. Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, supra note 197, §5143(a) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11922); 42 U.S.C. Ch. §§ 11901–11925; H.R. Res. 4483, 100th Cong.
(1988).
199. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5101.
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housing project, could be terminated from the program.200 Any suspicion of
drugs and the household was out. Moreover, leasehold interests were now
considered subject to civil forfeiture, allowing the government to take
possession of federally-subsidized housing units premises.201
The 1988 Act also authorized the Public Housing Drug Elimination
Program (“PHDEP”) as a pilot program meant to eradicate drug-related
activity in federally-subsidized housing.202 The goals of the program
included the eradication of drug-related crimes on or near public housing
projects, the development of strategies to address drug activities by Public
Housing Agencies (“PHAs”), and funding to effectuate these tactics.203 With
this, five key strategy topics evolved: (1) law enforcement/security, (2)
physical improvements, (3) drug treatment, (4) drug prevention, and (5)
Resident Council programs.204 Federal funding for enforcement was also
provided through an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, authorizing the Bureau of Justice Assistance to issue
block grants to housing programs confronting drug trafficking.205
President Reagan also successfully struck at legal services for the
poor.206 Legal services provide free civil legal representation to the poor,
including to federal housing assistance recipients.207 In his first term, Reagan
attempted to completely eliminate the congressional budget for the Legal
Services Corporation.208 After encountering opposition, he settled for
cutbacks.209 The cutback in federal funding left legal aid offices resourcestarved and unable to serve clients adequately.210 During his tenure, Reagan
also plugged the engine of the 1960s/1970s welfare rights movement: legal

200. Id.; see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(b)(1)(i); 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(c)(1) (“The lease must
provide that drug-related criminal activity engaged in, on or near the premises by any tenant,
household member, or guest, or such activity engaged in on the premises by any other person under
the tenant’s control, is grounds for the owner to terminate tenancy.”) (emphasis added).
201. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5105 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3751).
202. U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING DRUG ELIMINATION PROGRAM
RESOURCE DOCUMENT: FINAL REPORT (1994), https://www.huduser.gov/portal//Publications/pdf/
HUD-006464.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC HOUSING FINAL REPORT].
203. Id. at i–iv.
204. Id. at ii.
205. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5104 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3751).
206. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30, at 37.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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aid lawyers were now forbidden to file class action lawsuits against the
government, state and federal.211
1.2. The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990
During the presidential administration of George H.W. Bush, HUD
received substantial federal financial support for waging the War in
subsidized housing. This began with the enactment of the CranstonGonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.212 The legislation
issued directives requiring PHAs to target drug activity with regard to
program “preference” classifications,213 public housing lease provisions,214
and eviction procedures.215 The preference classification includes the poorest
families.216 The Act banned households from the “preference” classification
for three years if they were evicted from public housing in connection with
drug-related criminal activity, unless the tenant successfully completed
rehabilitation programming.217
Public housing leases were also required to explicitly implement the
War’s principles.218 PHAs were directed to impose lease provisions
incorporating the drug-related termination language,219 thereby transforming
“drug related activity” into an official and contractual program rule violation.
The legislation further established an “expedited” eviction procedure for
households allegedly involved in “drug-related criminal activity on or near”
a public housing project.220 PHAs were statutorily authorized to exclude this
class of terminations and evictions from the traditional administrative
grievance process, providing a faster track for a household’s removal.221
Serving as the HUD Secretary from 1989 to 1993, Jack Kemp executed an
aggressive multi-faceted attack on subsidized housing.222 Kemp’s strategy
included utilization of the fast track eviction procedure outlined in the Act,
211. Id.
212. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, supra note 179.
213. Id. § 501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)).
214. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5)).
215. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)).
216. Id. § 501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)).
217. Id. § 501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)).
218. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5)).
219. Id. § 504. Section 6(1)(5) of the Housing Act of 1937 was amended to read as follows:
“provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment
of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises,
engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.” Id.
220. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)).
221. Id.; see also 24 C.F.R.§ 982.51(a)(1)(i)(B).
222. Reagan, supra note 21, at 207.
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terminating households suspected of drug-related activity without an
administrative hearing.223
Moreover, it was during George H.W. Bush’s presidency that HUD was
permitted to award grants to PHAs to train tenant patrols and security
personnel, employ security, and hire investigators to investigate drug-related
crime specifically.224 From 1989 to 1993, Congress appropriated over $530
million to fund the PHDEP program started by Reagan as a pilot program:
“$8.2 million in FY 1989; $97.4 million in FY 1990; $140.8 million in FY
1991; $140.6 million in FY 1992; and $145.5 million in FY 1993.”225 Law
enforcement and security, as a category, was allocated the largest share of
PHDEP funding,226 which included the hiring of security personnel,
investigators, and “[a]dditional [s]ecurity and [p]rotective [s]ervices from
[l]ocal [l]aw [e]nforcement [a]gencies.”227 In reality, PHAs turned to local
enforcement to provide additional security rather than using private security
companies.228 PHAs were encouraged to collaborate with local law
enforcement to seek and destroy drug-related crime in public housing. The
tactics employed included information sharing between PHAS and law
enforcement, no-notice entries into the units of PHA tenants, and public
housing sweeps.
In his 1996 State of the Union Address, President Clinton declared the
“One Strike and You’re Out” policy, which helped to strengthen termination
rules in public housing.229 The negative political rhetoric that started during
Reagan’s administration was legislatively realized during the tenure of
President Bill Clinton with the decentralization of welfare and
implementation of conditions and restrictions on public assistance
recipients.230 As part of his tough on crime stance, he called for PHAs to
automatically terminate households suspected of engaging in drug-related
activity and to deny drug offenders admission to PHAs strictly based on

223. Id. (citing David B. Bryson & Roberta L. Youmans, Crimes, Drugs and Subsidized
Housing, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 435 (1990)).
224. See Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, supra note 197, § 5123 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11902); Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990,
supra note 179, § 581(a); Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, supra note 185,
§ 586(b).
225. See PUBLIC HOUSING FINAL REPORT., supra note 202, at i.
226. Id. at i-ii (“Law enforcement/security activities received the largest share of funds (47
percent). The prevention area received 38 percent; physical improvements, 6 percent; drug
treatment, 6 percent; and resident initiatives, 4 percent.”).
227. Id. at 32.
228. Id. at 38.
229. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 145, 181.
230. Id. at 182.
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having a past drug conviction.231 President Clinton’s “One Strike”
proclamation not only culminated in legislation, but it also impelled HUD to
draft and adopt regulations implementing more stringent exclusionary
standards.232
1.3. The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996
The legislation enacted in 1996, the Housing Opportunity Program
Extension Act of 1996,233 is perhaps the most pernicious of the anti-drug
housing legislation, as it further expanded the War’s reach to include the
Section 8 housing certificate and voucher (“HCV”) programs234—the most
utilized federally-subsidized housing program in the country.235 Legislation
previously enacted to combat drug crimes in public housing was now applied
to Section 8 programming.236 In addition, use or addiction to either drugs or
alcohol, were targeted for termination from both public housing and Section
8 programming.237 A PHA’s determination of reasonable cause that a tenant
is engaging in illegal drug or alcohol use was deemed a sufficient basis to
terminate and evict under the Act.238 Lease provisions were also revisited,
with termination language amended from “drug-related criminal activity on
or near the premises”239 to “drug-related criminal activity on or off the
premises.”240 Suspicion alone, not only criminal convictions, involving drugrelated criminal activity occurring anywhere served as permissible grounds
for termination from public housing and Section 8. In addition, Congress
authorized PHAs to pull criminal records to make admission and eviction
decisions.241 Thus, the United States Housing Act of 1937 was amended, yet
again, with wartime policy weaponizing national housing policy to capture
more prisoners. The War’s violence was mobilizing bodies not only from
society to prison but also from federal housing into the abyss of
homelessness.

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, supra note 184, § 1.
234. Id. § 9(e).
235. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, HUD, https://www.hud.gov/topics/
housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 (last visited May 30, 2021).
236. See Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, supra note 184, § 9.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5101.
240. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, supra note 184, § 9.
241. Id.
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1.4. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998
The final piece of major anti-drug housing legislation was the Quality
Housing and Work Responsibility (“QHWR”) Act of 1998.242 The QHWR
Act authorized PHAs to deny admission to applicant households with a
member who had “engaged in any drug-related . . . criminal activity” within
a “reasonable period.”243 Substance abuse was also once again a focal point
of anti-drug efforts with the QHWR Act authorizing PHAs to require
program applicants to sign a release of information for drug abuse treatment
centers.244 PHAs were then permitted to consider this information in deciding
whether the applicant or tenant was “currently” engaging in substance abuse
(alcohol or drugs).245
The QHWR Act also continued the War’s concentration on enforcement
by encouraging and emphasizing capacity-building and cooperation between
PHAs and law enforcement to address drug-related (and violent) crime in
federally-subsidized housing.246 Owners that refused to evict households for
suspicion of engaging in drug-related criminal activity were also at risk of
PHAs refusing to enter into new subsidy contracts.247
The administrative federal housing rules that developed during the War
provided an officially sanctioned basis for denial of and termination from
federally subsidized housing. Neither a criminal conviction nor an official
finding of a violation is required for exclusion.248 These administrative rules
granted PHAs enormous discretion in making eligibility determinations and
were encouraged by President Clinton himself.249
In terms of admissions to public housing and Section 8 certificate and
voucher programs, the HUD Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook
recommended (and still recommends) that PHAs perform criminal
background checks for a minimum of three years prior to potential
admission.250 With Congress authorizing PHAs to pull criminal records and
use a criminal history as a basis in admission and termination decisions,
public housing and Section 8 administrative rules developed to exclude
households strictly on the basis of a drug conviction of a household member.

242. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, supra note 197, § 501.
243. Id. § 576(c).
244. Id. § 575(e).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 586(b).
247. Id. § 545(a); see also Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, supra note 235.
248. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 146.
249. Id. at 145.
250. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 96–97
(2003), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_10760.PDF.
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PHAs are permitted to determine the “look-back” or set an “exclusion
period,” which is the length of time applicants must be crime-free before
being considered “eligible” for public housing. 251 According to the federal
statute, the look-back period should be for a “reasonable time,” though the
phrase is left undefined.252 Congress delegated that task to HUD and the
PHAs, which has resulted in varied and, often, unnecessarily severe lookback periods. For example, some PHAs implemented permanent bans on
specific crimes253 while others instituted unreasonably long look-back
periods.254 A 2011 study that investigated the waiting periods outlined in
over 100 tenant selections, found that over half of the plans had waiting
period in the double digits.255
Anti-drug housing legislation penetrated through many layers of
national housing policy. It influenced admissions, terminations, and lease
provisions. Moreover, it authorized a full-scale attack on public housing and
Section 8 programming by law enforcement that was backed by massive
federal expenditures. The police could raid households and families could
be torn apart and forbidden to live together pursuant to housing regulation.
Fathers, sons, mothers, daughters, uncles, and brothers were arrested, banned
from their public housing residence, and sent to jail or prison by the
boatloads. When they returned, they were prohibited from residing or even
visiting with their family based on a number of program rules. Thus, family
members would be forced to choose between risking their subsidy and
housing their family. With this, the drug enforcement machine was able to
flank poor, minority households, and their social networks under the banner
of the Drug War. The political rhetoric pronouncing, “law and order” and
“tough on crime” policies oozed into the conservative cries for welfare
251. 24 C.F.R. § 5.855(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c).
253. Marie Claire Tran-Leung, When Discretion Means Denial: The Use of Criminal Records to
Deny Low-Income People Access to Federally Subsidized Housing in Illinois, SHRIVER CTR. 10–11
(2011). The Shriver Center reports that “Brown County Housing Authority in Illinois permanently
bans applicants with prior convictions for any drug-related criminal activity other than possession
for personal use, such as manufacturing and sale.” Id. at 11 (citing BROWN COUNTY HOUSING
AUTHORITY, ADMISSIONS AND OCCUPANCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES 5 (2008)).
254. Id. The Shriver Center reviewed over 100 tenant selection plans in its study. Of the 100
that were reviewed, 77 adopted the following boilerplate language:
Applicants who fall into the following categories may be rejected.
a) Criminal convictions that involved physical violence to persons or property, or
endangered the health and safety of other persons within the last ___ years;
or
b) Criminal convictions in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance within the last _____ years.
Id. at 11–12.
255. Id. at 12.
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reform.256 By the end of President Clinton’s first term, criminal justice policy
had married welfare, producing harsh stipulations and exclusionary policies
based on illicit behavior that further narrowed the class of eligible housing
assistance recipients.257 “One Strike” tore through the hearts of many
families, leaving displaced bodies littered across the battlefields of federally
subsidized communities.
2. Repercussions
The attack on federal housing during the War created a climate of fear
and hostility in public housing and Section 8 HCV and certificate households.
The all-powerful government was permitted to aggressively hunt and trap
residents and guests, as well as intrude into homes and search without notice
or even a warrant. When challenged, the government set up the system to
suspend the procedural rights of those recipients suspected of drug related
criminal activity. And when the prisoners of the War returned home after
paying their debt, they further discovered that they remained
excommunicated from these housing communities.
2.1. Collaboration Between Law Enforcement and Housing
Authorities
The political rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s unifying public housing,
crime, and minorities—and legislation authorizing additional enforcement
and exclusions in the housing context—sanctioned a full government siege
on public housing and Section 8 HCV and certificate communities. 258 The
overlap between welfare and law enforcement agencies resulted in shared
“goals and attitudes toward the poor” as well as “collaborative practices and
shared information systems between welfare offices and various branches of
the criminal justice system.”259 The Clinton welfare reforms authorized the
policing of federal housing subsidies and, often, entire public housing
communities.260 The expansion of the power of both law enforcement and
PHAs promoted a negative and dangerous dichotomy between the
government and the tenants. Working together, PHAs and the police
employed practices that mirrored a wartime criminal investigation, utilizing
surveillance tactics and stigmatizing household members with overzealous

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

GUSTAFSON, supra note 30, at 1.
Id. at 1–2, 35; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1563–64.
See generally GUSTAFSON, supra note 30.
Id. at 2.
Ocean, supra note 30, at 1563.
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investigative strategies.261 Housing recipients were socio-economically
criminalized through the enforcement of wartime legislative directives and
administrative rules.
War on Drug legislation granted wide latitude in the decision-making
authority to law enforcement and PHAs as well as infused federal dollars to
fund collaborative strikes on federal housing communities. With wartime
rules stripping public housing and Section HCV recipients of privacy
protections, these two bodies mutated into a monolithic enforcement
structure that devoured its target. Under the flag of President Clinton’s “One
Strike” policy, PHAs and the police banned together and engaged in a type
of lawful lawlessness justified on the basis of suspicion of drug activity.
The drug enforcement piece was multifaceted. It ran the gamut from
the run of the mill “stop and frisk” campaigns to informant set-ups to
community raids to civil forfeiture. First, the intentional and widespread
deployment of “stop and frisk” on public housing grounds was not a secret.262
For example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed a federal class action
lawsuit against the New York Police Department citing its “unlawful policy
and practice of routinely stopping and arresting [New York City Housing
Authority] residents and guests” in a racially discriminatory manner.263 The
federal court upheld the challenge against a motion for summary
judgement.264
PHAs and local law enforcement worked together to not only
investigate and, when necessary, arrest and remove violators from federal
subsidized housing, they also collaborated to “set-up” targeted housing
recipients to specifically terminate a household’s subsidy.265 One instance
occurred in Berkeley, California beginning in 1989 with the City’s “Drug
Mitigation Policy.”266 The policy goal was the elimination of drugs from the
city through inter-departmental cooperation.267 One aspect of the policy
focused on “high crime areas” and specifically targeted Section 8 certificate
holders.268 The strategy was to trap suspected drug dealers through controlled
buys.269 Using a confidential informant, the drug task force would engage in
261. Leah Goodridge & Helen Strom, Innocent Until Proven Guilty?: Examining the
Constitutionality of Public Housing Evictions Based on Criminal Activity, 8 DUKE F. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 6 (2016).
262. Id.
263. Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 427, 430 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
264. Id. at 431.
265. Reagan, supra note 21, at 208.
266. Id. at 208–11.
267. Id. at 208.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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controlled buys, use the information to secure a search warrant, execute a
search of the unit, and then use that information to threaten the household
with termination.270 Most of the tenants threatened with termination were
grandmothers and mothers who had no knowledge of the acts of their
grandchildren and children—the basis of the termination.271
Searches of public housing units without advance notification or consent
also transpired.272 In total disregard of tenants’ Fourth Amendment right to
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures,”273 PHA employees and
law enforcement would enter federal subsidized housing units without
notifying the tenant in advance and without a warrant authorizing entry.274 In
one Florida federal district court case, a PHA interpreted a lease provision to
authorize a no-notice entry and inspection of a unit by a PHA and local law
enforcement.275 The lease provision provided that an inspection may occur
“at any time without advance notification when there is a reasonable cause to
believe that an emergency exists.”276 The PHA interpreted the provision as
a grant to enter without notice based on reasonable suspicion, as well as
permission for the PHA to search for evidence of criminal activity.277 The
district court granted the tenants’ request for a preliminary injunction against
the PHA’s practice.278 The court concluded the PHA was required to afford
advance notice and that, absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter
without a warrant.279
Perhaps the most damaging law enforcement/security tactics employed
were the sweeps of public housing complexes authorized under the PHDEP.
In pursuit of “drugs, weapons, and unauthorized persons,” law enforcement
(in collaboration with PHA employees and security personnel) would
perform sweeps of targeted buildings in public housing projects.280 The
Chicago Housing Authority’s (“CHA”) “Operation Clean Sweep” is one such
example.281 “Operation Clean Sweep, the CHAs ballyhooed security
program, did chase the gangbangers and drug dealers from the Prairie Court
270. Id. at 208–09.
271. Id. at 209.
272. Noble v. Tooley, 125 F. Supp. 2d 481 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
273. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
274. Noble, 125 F. Supp. at 483.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 486.
279. Id.
280. Chi. Hous. Auth., “Operation Clean Sweep” Implementation Guide, prepared for and filed
in Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 30, 1989); Case
Developments, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1281, 1291 (1991).
281. Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 280/
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high rise. But it also robbed innocent tenants of their freedom and
dignity . . . .”282
Beginning in the late 1980s, Operation Clean Sweep included a series
of raids on targeted buildings in Chicago public housing in pursuit of drugs,
guns, and unauthorized persons.283 Under the guise of inspecting units for
repairs, law enforcement, security personnel, and PHA maintenance would
search units for drugs, weapons, and unauthorized people.284 In the
December 1988 raid of the CHA’s Prairie Courts property, twenty-three
people were brought to a nearby police station, where twelve were charged
with criminal trespass of a state-supported building.285 Represented by the
ACLU, tenants later filed suit against the CHA and the City of Chicago,
which resulted in a consent decree designed to prevent the unconstitutional
conduct identified during these sweeps while simultaneously providing
necessary support to PHA efforts to improve public housing tenants’ quality
of life.286
2.2. Civil Forfeiture
The government also used civil forfeiture to seize public housing
leaseholds and evict tenants. In two important federal district court opinions
decided in 1990—United States v. 850 S. Maple287 and Richmond Tenants
Organization, Inc. v. Kemp288—the Government’s civil forfeiture tactics
were unveiled and successfully challenged. The strategy was entitled, the
“National Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Project”—a collaborative effort
by HUD and DOJ, authorizing the government to seize the homes of public
housing tenants suspected of drug-related activity without prior notice or a
hearing.289 In both of these cases, the government did just that—it seized the

282. Jane Juffer, Clean Sweep’s Dirty Secret, CHI. READER (Oct. 4, 1990),
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/clean-sweeps-dirty-secret/Content?oid=876436.
283. Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 280; Case Developments, supra note 280; Juffer, supra note
282.
284. Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 280.
285. Juffer, supra note 282 (“Twelve of those people were charged with criminal trespass of a
state-supported building, a misdemeanor. Three others were charged with unlawful use of a weapon
and three with possession of cocaine.”).
286. Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 30, 1989). The decree
established a new visitor policy whereby all tenants are permitted to have guests at all hours and for
up to two weeks. Id. If a guest plans to stay for longer than one day, the tenant is required to get a
guest card. As for the sweeps, PHAs are not absolutely barred from engaging in the sweep strategy
but are only permitted to do so if the PHA director finds a specific threat to a PHA tenant, employee,
business invitee, or the property. Id.
287. 743 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
288. 753 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Va. 1990).
289. Richmond Tenants Org., 753 F. Supp. at 608.
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homes of tenants without notice or a hearing.290 In turn, the courts found the
practice unconstitutional.291
In United State v. 850 S. Maple, the Government seized the public
housing unit pursuant to a warrant authorizing the seizure of a public housing
unit, as well as the immediate removal of the tenant.292 The warrant
application alleged the premises, occupied by Juide and her family, was being
used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine.293 The details are startling:
[T]he United States Marshal seized the apartment and evicted Juide
[the tenant] and her two children. Juide and her family, who were
asleep when they were awakened by the shouting of Government
agents inside her apartment, were not given any prior notice of this
action. According to Juide, one agent came into her bedroom with
a gun drawn and pointed directly at her head. She was told to leave
her apartment immediately. . . . Juide and her children were given
less than fifteen minutes in which to gather their belongings before
they were removed from their apartment. . . . In addition [to an
unidentified person filming inside the apartment], several members
of the news media were waiting outside the apartment unit with
additional cameras when Juide exited.294
Juide brought suit in federal district court, claiming that her due process
was violated when her leasehold interest was seized without prior notice or a
hearing.295 The district court agreed, finding that the government improperly
evicted Juide without notice or a hearing where the Government’s stance on
probable cause could be challenged.296
In Richmond Tenants Organization v. Kemp, a federal district court in
West Virginia held that the Government’s seizure of public housing units in
accordance with the National Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Project was
unlawful.297 In analyzing the issue, the district court, like the court in 850 S.
Maple, pointed to the special privacy protection afforded to homes against
unwarranted government intrusion.298 The court also noted the lack of

290. Id.; 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 514–15.
291. Richmond Tenants Org., 753 F. Supp. at 608; 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 514–15.
292. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 506.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 506–07 (citations omitted).
295. Id. at 511.
296. Id. at 509–11. The court recognized the special constitutional protection given to the home
and the lack of exigent circumstances that would permit the seizure of a home without prior notice
and a hearing. Id. at 510. The fact that a judicial officer authorized the seizure was deemed
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional understanding of due process. Id.
297. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607, 608 (E.D. Va. 1990).
298. Id. at 609.
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exigent circumstances.299 In balancing the interests, the district court
determined that the “the government’s interest is a narrow one of obtaining
pre-notice seizure of a fixed item like a home” and not the broader interest in
drug enforcement.300 For the court,
[t]he eviction of an entire household prior to a formal judicial
finding that forfeiture is justified constitutes a harm of major
proportions. To be rendered homeless for several months or more
while a civil forfeiture action is pending may be traumatic and
permanently damaging.301
Challenging PHA termination determinations was and continues to be
complicated by the lack of legal services and the existing rules that forego
traditional legal process.
The racial implications of the War’s influence on federally-subsidized
housing programs cannot be overstated. To begin with, Black households
are overrepresented among extremely low income or “ELI” renters and
constitute 45% of public housing residents, while 20% are Hispanic and 32%
are white.302 Similar percentages are reflected in the Section 8 HCV program,
with Black households representing 45% of voucher holders compared to
16% Hispanic households and 35% white households.303 Based strictly on
numbers, Black households were preordained to be disproportionately
affected by the housing aspect of the War. Compound this with the disparate
arrest and conviction rates of people of color, along with federal housing
program rules that allow exclusions based on suspicion of drug-related
activity, and it is clear that Black and brown communities were destined to
experience the greatest losses in the War.304
299. Id.
300. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1265 (2d Cir.
1989)).
301. Id.
302. Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., Who Lives in Federally Assisted Housing?, 2 HOUSING
SPOTLIGHT 1, 3 (2012).
303. Id.
304. See HELEN R. KANOVSKY, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL
RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED T RANSACTIONS 2 (2016),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF;
E.
ANN
CARSON, BUREAU JUST. STATS., PRISONERS IN 2014 15, tbl. 10 (2015),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf; FBI CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERV. DIV., CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2013 tbl.43A (2014) (reporting that African Americans comprised 28.3% of all
arrestees in 2013); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NATIONAL POPULATION BY CHARACTERISTICS (2021),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-national-detail.html (reporting
data showing that individuals identifying as African-American or Black alone made upon only
12.4% of the total U.S. population at 2013 year-end).
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As the power of PHAs and the police grew, the rights and liberties of
federal housing recipients decreased. During the War, families were
separated, homes were taken, and the legal process was suspended for those
suspected of drug-type criminality. Public housing tenants, and HCV and
certificate holders, were unsympathetic collateral victims in the War on
Drugs—victims themselves were branded as lazy, conniving, criminals, or
criminal affiliates. This narrative encouraged a more concentrated and
aggressive assault on the federal housing front. The unification of criminal
enforcement with conservative welfare reform produced the ideal
battleground, with the government fortifying the downhill advantage. The
rules that authorized such expansive attack remain and such scenarios
continue to play out every day.
The War on Drugs’ influence and impact on national housing policy was
devastating to prisoners returning home and their families. Prisoners are
often the poorest in society and lack the financial capacity to pay for private
housing.305 Anti-drug legislation and housing rules result in denials of federal
subsidy programs and/or the possibility of risking a household’s subsidy if
program rules are violated. Approximately two-thirds of returning prisoners
rely on family for housing upon release, but the risk to the household is often
grave.306 Homelessness is sometimes the only option. Branded with a drug
conviction, the War’s rules operate to maintain a physical separation between
those returning home and their families. This in turn impacts family
reunification; it affects opportunities for critical emotional and intimate
bonding, which is essential to heal families from the trauma of the War.
In addition to the familial disruption and racial impact, wartime housing
rules work to deprive returning prisoners of socio-economic citizenship.307
Housing is the starting point of any successful reintegration and is linked to
a variety of positive outcomes.308 Stable housing is correlated with reduced
recidivism and improves the prospect of creating positive relationships.309
Without housing, one does not gain stable footing. Once released from the
criminal policy grip of the War, prisoners continue to be targeted and
assaulted in the civil context.

305. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 148.
306. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE C ROSSROADS OF
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 72 (2019),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences.pdf [hereinafter COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES].
307. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30, at 53.
308. Breanne Pleggenkuhle, Beth M. Huebner & Kimberly R. Kras, Solid Start: Supportive
Housing, Social Support, and Reentry Transitions, 39 J. CRIME & JUST. 380, 381 (2016).
309. Id.
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Today, the competition for affordable housing is stiff. An estimated 43
million people live at or below the federal poverty level and compete for a
mere 7.5 million federally assisted housing units.310 Households that don’t
“play by the rules” and are suspected of drug use or any drug-related criminal
activity are subject to denial or termination from federal housing
programming. For HUD,
[a]t a time when the shrinking supply of affordable housing is not
keeping pace with the number of Americans who need it, it is
reasonable to allocate scarce resources to those who play by the
rules. . . . By refusing to evict or screen out problem tenants, we
are unjustly denying responsible and deserving low-income
families access to housing and are jeopardizing the community and
safety of existing residents who abide by the terms of their lease.311
Federal housing program eligibility thus becomes a cut-off point to help
“triage” the housing pressure and is “a politically cost-free way to entirely
cut out a large group of people from the pool of those seeking housing
assistance.”312
III. AFTERSHOCK
“My own view is that divisions never benefit anyone”
– Niccolo Machiavelli313
After 2009, the United States experienced a decline in its state jail and
prison populations—the first decline in forty years. 314 The number of adults
under correctional supervision (probation, jail, or prison) also fell for the first
time in thirty years. 315 Beginning in the early 2000s (and after the United
310. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, JESSICA L. SEMEGA & MELISSA A. KOLLAR, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 (2016),
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.html;
CATHERINE BISHOP,
NAT’L HOUS. L. PROJ., AN AFFORDABLE HOME ON RE-ENTRY: FEDERALLY ASSISTED HOUSING
AND
PREVIOUSLY
INCARCERATED
INDIVIDUALS
5
(2008),
https://nhlp.org/files/Page%204%20Doc%201%20Prisoner_Reentry_FINAL.pdf.
311. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS
DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING (2004), https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/11/18/no-secondchance/people-criminal-records-denied-access-public-housing#_ftnref50 (citing “‘One Strike and
You’re Out’ Policy in Public Housing”, HUD Directive No. 96-16 (April 12, 1996)).
312. Id.
313. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 73 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price trans., 1988).
314. Prison Count 2010: State Prison Population Declines for the First Time in 38 Years, PEW
CTR. ON THE STATES 1 (last updated Apr. 2010), https://www.pewtrusts.org//
media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/prisoncount20
10pdf.pdf.
315. Id.
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States had been ranked the world’s number one jailer), criminal justice policy
in America finally began to pivot.
A. Criminal Policy
“America is the land of second chance, and when the gates of
the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.”
– President George W. Bush316
By 2000, it was clear to researchers and scholars that the War on Drugs
was a disaster. Researchers reported that drug use remained constant and that
government enforcement and interdiction efforts were unsuccessful in
combatting drug traffickers.317 Millions were incarcerated, with the majority
of prisoners being minority and nonviolent offenders.318 The incarceration
rate had little correlation to the crime rate, and violent crime decreased 50%
between 1989 and 2017.319 In terms of expenditures, mass incarceration was
an “unsustainable long-term strategy.”320 And the label as the world’s
number one jailer was considered a political embarrassment.321 It was time
to review and overhaul drug policy. The focus was criminal law and
procedure, and it was the judicial branch that signaled the need for policy
reform and legislative change.
1. The Judicial Branch
It was the very body charged with crafting the details of federal drug
policy from the start of the War that made the first calls for change: the United
States Sentencing Commission. 322 The United States Supreme Court also
confronted questions concerning the constitutional validity of various aspects
of War on Drugs legislation. The conclusions and decisions offered by these
two judicial bodies together signaled an urgent need for legislative

316. George W. Bush, 2004 State of the Union Address, C-SPAN (Jan. 20, 2004), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4574544/president-bush-prisoner-entry-initiative.
317. Cole, supra note 171, at 36; Tonry, supra note 3, at 36; REUTER, CRAWFORD & CAVE,
supra note 52.
318. Cole, supra note 171, at 37; FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 5.
319. 2017: Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIM. JUST. INFO.
SERVS. DIV. tbl. 1 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topicpages/tables/table-1 (reporting 666.0 violent crimes per 100,000 people in 1989 versus 382.9 violent
crimes per 100,000 people in 2017).
320. Cole, supra note 171, at 35.
321. Id. at 37.
322. Beaver, supra note 37, at 2550.
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modifications to existing criminal drug policy, specifically concerning the
100:1 ratio and the imposition of long, harsh federal sentencing practices.
The crack cocaine to powder cocaine ratio (100:1) was the first occasion
for the counteroffensive against the War’s drug policy.323 The Sentencing
Commission led the battle by denouncing the ratio in its annual reports to
Congress beginning in the early 1990s.324 Calling for the elimination of the
ratio, the Commission described the problem as “urgent and compelling,”
concluding that the ratio was based upon a misunderstanding about the
dangers of crack.325 The Commission continued its denunciation of the
penalty scheme until 2007 when, in the absence of congressional action, it
adjusted its own Guidelines, lowering the recommended sentence for crack
offenses from 100:1 to 20:1.326
The Court inadvertently entered the fray in 2000 when it decided the
case of Apprendi v. New Jersey.327 New Jersey had a sentencing scheme
similar to that of the federal sentencing guidelines: allowing the sentencing
judge to find facts by a lesser standard of proof at sentencing than is required
in a criminal trial.328 If the judge found specific facts, the judge was permitted
to enhance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum.329 This practice
could, and often did, result in longer sentences. Although a state case, this
essentially called the sentencing provisions outlined in the federal scheme
into question. The Court found the penalty structure to be a violation of a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury’s determination of facts.330
With this, the Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”331 With “the stroke of a pen,” the

323. Id.
324. Id.
325. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY 8–9 (2007), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimonyand-reports/drug-topics/200705_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf.
326. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,’ GUIDELINES MANUAL 140, § 2D1.1 (2007).
327. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
328. Id. at 467–68. Petitioner Apprendi was charged with possession of a firearm for an unlawful
person in the second-degree, which carried a five- to ten-year term of imprisonment. Id. at 468.
The count did not include a reference to the hate crime statute. After he plead guilty, the prosecutor
moved to enhance his sentence based on the hate crime statute. Id. at 468–69. At sentencing, the
prosecutor only had to prove the elements of the statute by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at
469. Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years in prison on the firearm count, two years more than
permitted by statute. Id. at 471.
329. Id. at 490–92.
330. Id. at 490.
331. Id.
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foundation of two decades of state sentencing began to crumble.332 As Justice
O’Connor predicted in her dissent, the federal system followed.333
The War was now being attacked from a constitutional angle. The first
in the trilogy of War on Drugs criminal policy, the Crime Control Act of
1984, was dealt a severe blow from which it would not recover. In 2005, the
Court decided United States v. Booker,334 holding that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, standing as mandatory, violated the Sixth Amendment.335 The
Court found two provisions unconstitutional and directed the federal courts
to consider the Guidelines as “effectively advisory.”336 One of the hallmark
provisions of anti-drug legislation, the Sentencing Reform Act, was
essentially gutted. Per Booker, federal courts were required to impose a
criminal sentence based on the statutory factors laid out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a);337 the Guidelines were only advisory. Once Booker was decided,
the War’s sentencing structure crumbled.
Soon after Booker, the Court considered constitutional issues
concerning the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986’s 100:1 powder to crack
cocaine ratio. The Court dealt the notorious 100:1 ratio a deathblow by the
Court between 2007 and 2009 in two cases: Kimbrough v. United States338
and Spears v. United States.339 In Kimbrough, the Court held that federal
courts may ignore the Guidelines based on ideological differences with the
ratio.340 In upholding the lower court’s decision to depart from the ratio, the
Court cited the Sentencing Commission’s 2002 report finding that
approximately 85% of federal criminal defendants convicted of crack
offenses were Black, which in turn promoted a lack of confidence in the
system.341 For the Court, Congress was credulous with regard to the dangers
of crack at the time that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was enacted.342 In
Spears, the Court took Kimbrough a step further and held that federal courts
were permitted to establish their own ratios.343

332. Id. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
333. Id. (“[T]he apparent effect of the Court’s opinion today is to halt the current debate on
sentencing reform in its tracks and to invalidate with the stroke of a pen three decades’’ worth of
nationwide reform.”).
334. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
335. Id. at 244.
336. Id. at 245.
337. Id.; see Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 489–92 (2011).
338. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
339. 555 U.S. 261 (2009) (per curiam).
340. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91.
341. Id. at 98.
342. Id. at 95.
343. Spears, 555 U.S. at 265–68.
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2. Legislative Branch
The Congressional rollback of the War’s anti-drug laws formally started
in 2007 and continues into the present. The consequences of the War on
Drugs—mass incarceration, the costs of corrections, and international
shame—were now on full display with no reasonable justification to continue
the War. Judicial signaling added pressure. Congress had to act. In the past
twelve years, three major pieces of legislation were enacted that work to
comprehensively review and modify the War’s anti-drug policy: (1) the
Second Chance Act of 2007,344 (2) the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,345 and
(3) the First Step Act of 2018.346 Redemption, fairness, and second chances
formulate the ideological underpinnings of all three Acts.
2.1. The Second Chance Act of 2007
With the Second Chance Act of 2007,347 Congress started its retreat
from the War and introduced an ideology of redemption and compassion into
the criminal drug laws. Amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, the Act focused on alternatives to incarceration348 and
drug treatment, both in and out of prison.349 The legislation represented a
clear withdrawal from the stringent mandatory imprisonment directives and
supply-side attacks authorized by the War’s anti-drug legislation.
A bipartisan effort, the Act encouraged a holistic approach to offender
release and promoted federal reentry efforts.350 The legislation allocated
grant dollars to agencies and organizations that implemented evidence-based
programming proven to reduce recidivism.351 Concentrating on both public
safety and criminal recidivism, Congress pledged support to the efforts of
both state and federal criminal justice systems that were working towards
successfully transitioning the prisoners of the War back into society.352
Although the Second Chance Act did not repeal the harsh sentencing laws
outright or modify the War’s supply-side strategy, it started to shift the
direction of America’s criminal justice approach.
344. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199 § 1, 122 Stat. 657 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
345. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 1; Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27.
346. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9, § 1; Erin McCarthy Holliday, President Trump signs
criminal justice reform First Step Act into law (Dec. 21, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.jurist.org/
news/2018/12/president-trump-signs-criminal-justice-reform-first-step-act-into-law/.
347. Second Chance Act of 2007, supra note 344, § 101(a)(3).
348. Id. § 2901 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3797q).
349. Id. § 201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17521).
350. Id. § 101(a)(3).
351. Id. § 101(g).
352. Id. § 3(a)(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17501).
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2.2. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
Three years later, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,353
which continued the statutory counterattack against the War’s anti-drug
legislation. The Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) amended the Controlled
Substances Act once again and imposed a powder-to-crack cocaine ratio of
18:1 as opposed to 100:1.354 Before the FSA was passed, the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence required for distribution of fifty grams or more
of crack cocaine was ten years.355 After the Act, 280 grams or more were
required to trigger the ten-year sentence.356 The FSA also eliminated the
mandatory minimum sentence imposed for simple possession of crack
cocaine.357 In enacting the FSA, Congress was acting to “‘restore fairness to
federal cocaine sentencing’ laws that had unfairly impacted blacks for almost
25 years.”358 The legislation shifted the political focus from drug offenders
as a broad class to violent drug traffickers specifically, by increasing the
penalties for violent drug offenders359 and those who play a substantial role
in drug conspiracies.360 Although the Act offered promise of relief from the
harshness of the War’s drug policy, it applied only prospectively.361
2.3. The First Step Act of 2018
Most recently, Congress enacted the First Step Act in 2018.362 The First
Step Act continued the momentum of redemption with a number of
provisions to dismantle the War’s legislation and further encourage reentry
programming. Perhaps most significantly, the Act called for the retroactive
application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010’s powder-to-crack cocaine

353. Id.
353. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 1; Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27.
354. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 2(a) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1));
Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27.
355. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 2(a) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1));
Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27.
356. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 2(a) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1));
Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27; Memorandum from Gary G. Grindle, Acting Deputy Atty. Gen.,
to All Federal Prosecutors 2 (Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/
2014/07/23/fair-sentencing-act-memo.pdf (regarding the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010).
357. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 3; Grindle, supra note 356, at 1.
358. United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 484 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated, 746 F. 3d 647 (6th
Cir. 2013) (en banc).
359. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 6; Grindle, supra note 356, at 2.
360. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 6.
361. Id.
362. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9.
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ratio of 18:1.363 Thus, all federal prisoners convicted and sentenced under
the old 100:1 ratio were to be resentenced under the 18:1 ratio.364
The First Step Act also allocated funding pursuant to the Second Chance
Act of 2007365 and included a number of reentry-related provisions that offer
incentives to federal prisoners who participate in recidivism reduction
programming in prison.366 In addition, the Act encourages the federal Bureau
of Prisons to partner with community, faith-based, and nonprofit
organizations to provide federal recidivism reduction programming in
prison.367 The First Step Act not only continued to release the prison pressure
valve, it also maintained the stream of federal dollars to support the prisoners
of the War in their transition back home.
3. Executive Branch
The policies of the Executive Branch shifted along with those of the
other two branches of government. In his 2004 State of the Union address,
President George W. Bush asked Americans “to consider another group of
Americans in need of help”—the 600,000 people released from prison back
into society annually.368 He proposed a $300 million federal allocation to
reentry efforts that would assist with providing newly released prisoners
transitional housing and employment readiness programming—the Prisoner
Reentry Initiative (“PRI”).369 Both liberal Democrats, such as Representative
John Conyers, and conservative Republicans, such as Sam Brownback,
supported the proposal.
With the election of President Obama, DOJ made sweeping changes to
the administration of criminal justice through its “Smart on Crime” initiative,
which included major changes to federal charging policies.370 In 2010,
Attorney General Eric Holder began reversing and modifying a number of
Department charging guidelines, including a policy that required federal
prosecutors to charge federal defendants with offenses that could result in the

363. Id. § 404 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841).
364. Id.
365. Id. Title V (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10101).
366. Id. § 101. These incentives may include increased phone privileges, additional time for
visitation, placement in a facility closer to the prisoner’s release residence, increased commissary,
and extended email opportunities. Id.
367. Id. § 504(g).
368. 2004 State of the Union Address, supra note 316.
369. Id.
370. Obama, supra note 12, at 824.
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harshest possible sentence.371 Instead, federal prosecutors were instructed to
bring charges based on an individualized analysis of the defendant’s
circumstances, as “equal justice depends on individualized justice, and smart
law enforcement demands it.”372 Attorney General Holder also directed
federal prosecutors to stop utilizing “Section 851” enhancements—a
recidivist enhancement that triggers severe mandatory minimums and longer
sentences based on prior drug convictions—to acquire leverage in plea
negotiations. 373 In 2013, and for the first time in thirty-three years, the
proportion of drug offenders convicted of an offense carrying a minimum
penalty declined and the overall federal prison population experienced a
reduction.374
During President Obama’s second term, DOJ announced a number of
data driven reentry related initiatives emphasizing evidence-based practices
to reduce recidivism and address core behavioral issues. 375 In 2016, it
announced that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) was constructing “a
semiautonomous school district within the federal prison system—one that
blends face-to-face classroom instruction with education software on mobile
tablets.”376 That same year, DOJ launched “National Reentry Week,” where
Attorney General Loretta Lynch announced the Administration’s strategic
reentry plan—the “Roadmap to Reentry.” 377 The Roadmap outlined an
overhaul to the federal prison system with the twin goals of reducing
371. Id. at 825 (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to All
Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), https://subjecttoinquiry.lexblogplatformtwo.com/
files/2013/09/Holder-Charging-Memo-5-19-10.pdf.).
372. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to All
Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), https://subjecttoinquiry.lexblogplatformtwo.com/
files/2013/09/Holder-Charging-Memo-5-19-10.pdf.).
373. Id. (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y. Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to
Department of Justice Attorneys (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/
criminal_defense_topics/essential_topics/sentencing_resources/clemency/memorandum-to-allfederal-prosecutors-from-eric-h-holder-jr-attorney-general-on-851-enhancements-in-pleanegotiations.pdf).
374. Id. at 826 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL
YEAR
2015
7–8
(2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf; BUREAU
OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
2013 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf).
375. Id. at 832 (citing Prison Reform: Reducing Recidivism by Strengthening the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/prison-reform).
376. Id. (citing Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Announces Reforms at Bureau of Prisons to Reduce Recidivism and Promote Inmate Rehabilitation
’(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-reforms-bureauprisons-reduce-recidivism-andpromote-inmate).
377. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ROADMAP TO REENTRY (2016),
https://www.justice.gov/reentry/file/844356/download).
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recidivism and improving outcomes for prison releasees.378 Halfway houses
and residential reentry centers also experienced some reform, with DOJ
crafting new standards and funding various reentry-related costs (for
example, state-issued identification).379
Recent presidents have also used the executive clemency power to
eliminate the relics of the War’s drug policy. Though the clemency power
was used frequently at one point in American history, the practice declined
with the advent of the parole system. 380 With “truth in sentencing” rhetoric
pronounced in the 1980s, the use of clemency was largely abandoned.381 The
Obama Administration looked closely at the clemency power as a possible
tool to address the excessive sentencing practices of the War.382 More
specifically the efforts were meant
to identify types of inmates who deserve particular consideration
for clemency—and to encourage individuals who have
demonstrated good behavior in the federal system to seek
clemency if they were sentenced under outdated laws that have
since been changed and are no longer appropriate to accomplish
the legitimate goals of sentencing.383
With this, the Obama Administration launched an executive clemency
initiative. By the end of his Presidency, President Obama had commuted the
criminal sentences of 1,927 individuals, totaling more commutations than the
past eleven American presidents combined.384 In using clemency during his
term to remedy unjust wartime sentences, President Obama brought visibility
to the power and its potential use. During his administration, President
Trump also used the power to provide relief to federal prisoners of the War
on Drugs.385
The reform in criminal justice policy at the federal level has trickled
down to the states. States are currently reforming supervision and
implementing sentencing practices that authorize alternatives to
imprisonment.386 They are increasing resources to support reentry-related

378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 835 (observing that between 1885 and 1930, an average 222 pardons were issued per
year) (citing Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 814 (2015)).
381. Id. at 835–36 (citing Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (last updated Oct. 28, 2016),
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm).
382. Id. at 836.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 837.
385. Id.; Pardons Granted by President Donald J. Trump (2017–2021), supra note 12.
386. Cole, supra note 171, at 30.
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programming,387 with a number of states reinvesting cost savings associated
with early release programs into community programming in the inner
cities.388 States are closing prisons,389 and many are offering more substance
abuse programs, as well as diversions to treatment as an alternative to
imprisonment.390 However, the redemption and second chances offered in
the criminal justice context at both the federal and state levels have failed to
penetrate other critical areas of substantive law and regulation influenced by
the War on Drugs, such as national housing policy.
B. Housing Policy
“If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen
the side of the oppressor.”
– Desmond Tutu391
The War’s influence in the criminal context permeated federal housing
policy. However, the reform movement has not resulted in the same
legislative overhaul in the federal housing context. Instead, the statutes and
regulations enacted during the War remain on the books without modification
or amendment. With this, the proclamation of redemption and second
chances for the prisoners of the War remains a promise unfulfilled: the offer
extends only so far.
It is no secret that a disproportionate number of the poor have a criminal
history or have immediate family members with criminal records. Over 11
million men and women are moving in and out of U.S. jails every year.392 An
estimated 100 million Americans—roughly a third of the adult population—
have some type of criminal record.393 Approximately 600,000 prisoners are
387. Id. at 32.
388. CSG Justice Center Staff, JRI Maximizing State Reforms Awards Announced for FY2017,
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://csgjusticecenter.org/jr.
389. VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 6 (2009)
390. Cole, supra note 171, at 30.
391. OXFORD ESSENTIAL QUOTATIONS (5th ed. 2017), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/
10.1093/acref/9780191843730.001.0001/q-oro-ed5-00016497.
392. Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who Is Listening?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 14,
2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/.
393. SENT’G
PROJ.,
AMERICANS
WITH
CRIMINAL
RECORDS
2
(2015),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-CriminalRecords-Poverty-and-Opportunity-Profile.pdf; WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS,
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON INCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 46 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160423_cea_incarceration_c
riminal_justice.pdf [hereinafter ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES].
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released each year without a program to assist in the transition back into
society.394 Most of these individuals are slated to return home to their
families, many of whom may be living in federally subsidized housing. 395
As mentioned above, approximately two-thirds of those returning home
rely on family for housing.396 Studies indicate this dependence is long-term
in nature, finding only 19% of the respondents are able to establish
independent housing nearly a year and half after release.397 It is critical that
newly released persons have instant housing, as the highest risk of recidivism
occurs immediately upon release.398 Housing serves as the foundation of a
productive and successful reintegration.399 Positive outcomes associated
with stable housing include better employment opportunities and a reduction
in criminal recidivism.400
For those returning home, securing housing is extremely difficult.
Prisoners returning to families that receive federal housing assistance may
endanger the household subsidy and/or be outright denied a tenancy.401 The
private housing market also may not be an option, as returning persons
typically have a minimal work history and little or no money.402
In the past thirty years, reentry scholars and advocates have encouraged
the review and reform of a number of collateral consequences, gaining
significant traction with voting and employment. 403
For example,
Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza’s 2000 study demonstrated the way in
which felon disenfranchisement could affect election outcomes.404 Today,

394. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 393, at 24.
395. Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev., to PHA Executive Directors 1
(June 17, 2011), https://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/asset_library/Rentry_letter_from_
Donovan_to_PHAs_6-17-11.pdf.
396. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 306.
397. Jennifer Yahner & Christy Visher, Illinois Prisoners’ Reentry Success Three Years After
Release, URB. INST. (2008).
398. Pleggenkuhle, Huebner & Kras, supra note 308, at 381; Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul,
Prisoners Once Removed: The Children and Families of Prisoners, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED:
THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 23
(Jeremy Travis & Michelle Wall eds., 2003).
399. Pleggenkuhle, Huebner & Kras, supra note 308, at 381.
400. Id.
401. See generally Travis & Waul, supra note 398.
402. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 306; Travis & Waul, supra note 398, at 23.
403. See e.g., Pinard & Thompson, supra note 16; Love, supra note 29; COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 306; Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for
Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999).
404. See generally Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 786–
90 (2002) (presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, on August
16, 2000, in Washington D.C.).
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most states re-enfranchise upon completion of a criminal sentence.405
Moreover, for the past decade, not-for-profit agencies, as well as
governmental bodies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), have worked on implementing fairness standards in
both the public and private employment markets concerning applicants with
criminal histories. However, national housing policy has remained largely
untouched. Individuals with a drug history or suspicion of drug activity
remain excluded from federally subsidized housing at a time when they need
it the most—upon release from prison. This translates to a “we’ll let ‘em
vote when their sentence is complete, we may even let ‘em work but we don’t
want to live with ‘em or let ‘em live off our taxpayer dollars” sentiment. The
War’s anti-drug housing legislation should be reviewed with the purpose of
recalibrating the rules to reflect the redemptive ideological shift in policy
underlying the reform experienced in criminal context. Though minimal,
there has been some movement in the housing arena that could be used as a
springboard for a thorough and intentional review of anti-drug policy.
1. Judicial Branch
Unlike the experience in the criminal law context, the judicial branch
has been somewhat timid and, at times, torn between administrative
deference and the principles of fairness and equity. Courts reviewing housing
rules and practices typically defer to PHA administrative decisions.406 But
courts have also invalidated and reversed PHA administrative determinations
steeped in the harshness encouraged by the War on Drugs. 407 Lower court
decisions addressing anti-drug legislation specifically fall into two principal
categories: (1) PHA use of criminal records and (2) terminations based on
drug-related criminal activity.
Perhaps the issue that has gained most traction in the courts is the use of
criminal histories to disqualify or terminate households from federally
subsidized housing. As mentioned, courts generally defer to PHA
administrative termination decisions.408 In recent years, however, some
courts have invalidated PHA determinations. For example, in Cabrini-Green
Local Advisory Council v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,409 a federal district court
struck down a lease provision that required the eviction of tenants convicted
405. SENT’G PROJ.,
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER
2 (2014),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_Felony%20Disenfranchisement%20Primer.
pdf.
406. See supra Part II.
407. Id.
408. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552 (La. Ct. App. 1995); South S.F.
Hous. Auth. v. Guillory, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 370 (App. Dep’t. Super. Ct. 1995).
409. No. 96 C 6949, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6520 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2007).

2021]

THE TRAP CHRONICLES, VOL. 1

617

of a felony.410 The court concluded that the provision was a blanket
prohibition that improperly expanded the PHA’s authority without any
rational relation “to any legitimate housing purposes.”411 In another case,
Landers v. Chicago Housing Authority,412 the Chicago Housing Authority
(“CHA”) denied the petitioner’s application based on “a pattern of arrest
and/or conviction.”413 The petitioner produced evidence that all of the
criminal charges were dismissed.414 Despite this evidence, his application
was still denied.415 On appeal to the circuit court, the court determined that
the petitioner did not pose a threat, and that almost all his arrests were
dismissed and were also the result of homelessness.416 The Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed the circuit court.417
The War’s housing program rules also make it difficult to maintain the
family structure when a household member has a criminal history,
particularly a drug history. For many households, accepting a federal
housing program subsidy is a trap—you have housing assistance, but you
must sacrifice a family member in exchange for housing. Many have trouble
excising fathers, sons, daughter, and mothers from their households and thus
risk a finding of program rule violations. The courts are hearing such cases.
In In re Juanita Matos v. Hernandez,418 a New York appellate court
410. ..Id. at *15–16. The lease provision read: “For termination of the LEASE, the following
procedures shall be followed by LESSOR and the TENANT: . . . The LEASE may be
terminated . . . [when] [t]he TENANT or any authorized family member is convicted of a felony.”
Id. at *3–4 (alterations in original).
411. Id. at *8–9, *13.
412. 936 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
413. Id. at 736.
414. Id. at 737, 740.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 737.
417. Id. at 742. The court reviewed the CHA’s administrative plan rules and regulations. Id. at
738–39. Examining the provision governing rejections based on arrests reports, the court pointed
out that the CHA’s own policy requires the CHA to place “the applicant’s name . . . on the wait list
until documentation is presented showing the outcome of the case.” Id. at 739. For the court, the
evidence in the case was “bare bones.” Id. at 740. Recognizing that the CHA is not required to
meet any evidentiary standard, the court was displeased that the CHA failed to even meet a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 741.
418. 79 A.D. 3d 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also Wellington Hous. Auth. v. Murphy, 131
S.W.3d 378, 379 (Mo. App. 2004). In Murphy, the PHA terminated the respondent’s lease for
“having an unauthorized male . . . with a criminal record residing in your apartment and/or inviting
a male . . . with a criminal record to your unit after being told of his criminal conviction and that he
was not allowed to come on any Wellston Housing Authority’s property, and/or placing other
residents in danger because of [his] prior criminal activity.” Murphy, 131 S.W.3d at 379 (alterations
in original). On appeal, the housing authority argued that the trial court erred in determining that it
could not evict the tenant for her guest’s prior criminal record. Id. It argued that 42 U.S.C.
1437d(l)(6) granted PHAs the discretion to terminate a tenant’s lease on the basis of a guest’s
“criminal activity” that may threaten the safety of other residents. Id. at 380. The Missouri Court
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determined that a PHA’s decision to condition the continuation of housing
benefits on the permanent exclusion of the tenant’s son “was so
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the judicial conscience” and
warrant a “lesser sanction.”419 In this case, the tenant’s son was convicted of
two misdemeanor offenses but was always in compliance with program
rules.420 The tenant was also disabled and relied on her son and his younger
brother for her care.421 The court held that the PHA’s determination was
disproportionate to the tenant’s offense.422 Nevertheless, courts generally
continue to enforce terminations based on drug-related criminal activity.
The drug-related criminal activity lease provision has also been
challenged in the courts. The provision extends not only to the tenant and
household members, but also to “guest[s]” and other persons “under the
tenant’s control.”423 A “guest” subjects the household to greater liability than
an “other person under the tenant’s control.”424 A “guest,” as defined by
HUD, is a person “staying in the unit with the permission of the tenant or
another household member with the authority to give such permission.” 425
An “other person under the tenant’s control” is defined as a “short-term
invitee who is not ‘staying’ in the unit.”426 Taken together, the statute and
regulations create strict liability for the actions of a third party.
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in HUD v. Rucker427 upheld
the provision, determining that the no-fault eviction lease provision did not
violate due process.428 Instead, the PHA was acting as a landlord enforcing
the lease.429 In that case, public housing tenants of the Oakland Housing
Authority (“OHA”) in Oakland, California sued HUD, OHA, and the
of Appeals interpreted the governing statute to only include criminal activity that occurred during
the term of the lease. Id. Because the criminal record of the guest occurred prior to the term of the
lease, that conduct was excluded from the conduct considered by the statute as relevant to a
termination. Id. The PHA also argued that because it authorized to reject an applicant based on a
criminal record or prevent individuals with criminal records from entering the premises, it is also
authorized to evict a tenant based on a guest’s criminal record. Id. at 380–81. The court disagreed
recognizing that a PHAs right to exclude an individual with a criminal record is “separate and
distinct” from the PHAs rights in relation to a termination of a tenant. Id. at 381.
419. Hernandez, 79 A.D.3d at 466–67.
420. Id. at 467.
421. Id.
422. Id. 466–67
423. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii).
424. Id.
425. Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,776,
28,777 (May 24, 2001) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.100).
426. Id. at 28,777–78 (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.100).
427. 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002).
428. Id. at 135.
429. Id. at 135.
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Director of OHA in federal court after the Authority initiated eviction
proceedings in state court based on the no-fault lease provision.430 The state
court eviction proceedings included three cases based on the following facts:
(1) that respective grandsons of respondents William Lee and
Barbara Hill, both of whom were listed as residents on the leases,
were caught in the apartment complex parking lot smoking
marijuana; (2) that the daughter of respondent Pearlie Rucker, who
resides with her and is listed on the lease as a resident, was found
with cocaine and a crack cocaine pipe three blocks from Rucker’s
apartment; and (3) that . . . Herman Walker’s caregiver and two
others were found with cocaine in Walker’s apartment. OHA had
issued Walker notices of a lease violation on the first two
occasions, before initiating the eviction action after the third
violation.431
The tenants argued the statute did not require the lease terms to evict
“innocent” tenants and alternatively argued that if the statute did require such
evictions, then the statute is unconstitutional.432
The district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the OHA
from evicting tenants “for drugrelated [sic] criminal activity that does not
occur within the tenant’s apartment unit when the tenant did not know of and
had no reason to know of, the drug-related criminal activity.”433 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the statute did
permit no-fault evictions regardless of the knowledge of the tenant.434 An en
banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, and affirmed the district court’s
determination that HUD’s interpretation authorizing the eviction of
“‘innocent’ tenants ‘is inconsistent with Congressional intent.’”435 For the
en banc court, such an interpretation raised “‘serious questions under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ because it permits ‘tenants to
be deprived of their property interest without any relationship to individual
wrongdoing.’”436 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local
public authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related
activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew or
should have known about the activity.437
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 129.
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 129–30.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 135 (quoting Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Id. at 136.
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The Court’s decision was based primarily on a textual analysis finding
that the statutory language was clear.438 However, it addressed the due
process concern, concluding that the government was not trying to punish or
regulate “respondents as members of the general populace.”439 For the Court,
the government was instead “acting as a landlord of property that it owns,
invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and which
Congress has expressly required.”440 With this, third-party strict liability
based on drug-related criminal activity was proclaimed constitutionally
permissible.
Lower courts struggling with the third-party strict liability lease
provision produce mixed results. Generally, a household member that
possesses drugs or engages in drug-related criminal activity subjects the
entire household to termination and/or eviction. For example, in South San
Francisco Housing Authority v. Guillory441 an entire family was evicted
based on the actions of the son, a household member who possessed drugs
within the home.442 The court concluded that the entire household was liable
for the acts of one member.443
Some courts have identified factual nuances that permit a tenant to
escape liability. In Housing Authority of the City of Hoboken v. Alicea,444 the
PHA terminated a tenant from federally subsidized programming based on
her son’s arrest and conviction of drug possession in the tenant’s apartment
building—not in the tenant’s unit. The court disagreed with the PHA’s
determination because the tenant did not allow her son to live in her unit nor
did she have knowledge that her son was involved in drug-related criminal
activity.445 Also, in Syracuse Housing Authority v. Boule,446 a tenant was
evicted for the drug-related criminal activities of a babysitter’s guest.447 The
court concluded that the tenant had not given the babysitter authority to invite
guests to her unit and thus had no knowledge that the babysitter’s guests sold
drugs from her unit.448 However, in Housing Authority of New Orleans v.
Green,449 a tenant was terminated because a friend of her daughter hid drugs
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Id. at 130–32.
Id. at 135.
Id.
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 371–72.
688 A.2d 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
Id. at 110.
265 A.D.2d. 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
Id. at 832.
Id.
657 So. 2d 552 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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in her home without the tenant’s knowledge. The Louisiana court upheld the
PHA’s termination, finding the tenant strictly liable for the actions of her
daughter’s guest.450
Bound by HUD v. Rucker, restricted by the principles of administrative
law, and constrained by otherwise valid anti-drug legislation, the judiciary is
left without an appropriate legal vehicle to join the movement experienced in
the criminal law. Unless an opportunity presents itself, reform must originate
from the other branches of government.
2. Legislative Branch
Congress and state legislatures have left the War’s anti-drug housing
policy largely intact. The rules enacted during the War have yet to be
reviewed or modified, continuing to wreak havoc on the communities and
families of the prisoners of the War. Although national housing policy, as a
substantive area of law, has been largely ignored, the redemptive criminal
legislation enacted recently mentions housing as a focus area in the
development of wraparound reentry services. For example, the Second
Chance Act promised to
provid[e] coordinated supervision and comprehensive services for
offenders upon release from prison, jail, or a juvenile facility,
including housing and mental and physical health care to facilitate
re-entry into the community, and which, to the extent applicable,
are provided by community-based entities.451
The goals underlying these proposed programs include helping
“offenders to develop safe, healthy, and responsible family relationships and
parent-child relationships,”452 as well as the inclusion of the entire family unit
in the reentry process.453 Moreover, the legislation explicitly authorized grant
funds to provide housing assistance to adult offenders.454 Aside from this
scant reference to housing brushed in broad strokes, the Act is silent.
The more recent First Step Act also considers housing in its reentry
legislation. The Act codified the efforts of the Reentry Council, the cabinetlevel agency formed during the Obama Administration that worked to

450. Id. at 553–54.
451. Second Chance Act of 2007, supra note 344, § 101(a)(3); see also CORINNE CAREY,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED
ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING 17–18 (2004), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
usa1104.pdf.
452. Second Chance Act of 2007, supra note 344, § 101(a)(4)(A).
453. Id. § 101(a)(4)(B).
454. Id. § 111.
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coordinate supportive services to prisoners returning home.455 The
legislation calls for federal interagency reentry collaboration among various
cabinet-level agencies, including HUD, as well as nonprofits and other
interested stakeholders to coordinate services to support new releasees.456
The Act also reauthorizes Second Chance Act grant dollars to be allocated to
agencies and nonprofit organizations involved in transitioning former
prisoners back into society through coordinated services that include securing
housing.457 In assessing outcomes, housing was listed as a required
performance measurement.458 Moreover, the Act directs that the planning for
transitional housing begin upon admission to jail or prison.459
While the First Step Act demonstrates a congressional
acknowledgement of housing as a factor in achieving success in the transition
from prison back to society, in reality it does little more than identify housing
as a problem. The rules enacted during the War contribute to maintaining the
housing problem and remain completely ignored. There are no amendments
to any of the War on Drugs housing legislation. Indeed, they remain on the
books and continue to be enforced with vigor by PHAs. Thus, the redemption
promised in recent legislation only works to open the prison gates. It does
not restore the formerly incarcerated to full citizenship with a clean slate.
The drug history obtained during the War follows the formerly incarcerated
individual through the prison gates and operates to close doors of opportunity
shut by the War’s anti-drug legislation.
3. Executive
Beginning with President George W. Bush in 2004, criminal recidivism
and offender reentry has moved to the forefront of the political agenda. The
stance is no longer “tough on crime.” Instead, it is “second chances.”
As mentioned above, President Bush proposed a four year $300 million
reentry grant called the Prisoner Re-entry Initiative (“PRI”) in his 2004 State
of the Union Address.460 The project operated through a federal partnership
that included DOJ, the Department of Labor (“DOL”), and HUD.461 The
purpose of the PRI was to assist ex-offenders in successfully integrating back
455. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL: A RECORD OF
PROGRESS AND ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE 13 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
static.nicic.gov/Library/032749.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL].
456. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9, § 505.
457. Id. § 3041 (“Grant Program to Evaluate and Improve Educational Methods at Prisons, Jails,
and Juvenile Facilities”).
458. Id. § 507(a)(1) (“Evaluation of the Second Chance Act Program”).
459. Id. § 502(f)(3)(C)(i).
460. 2004 State of the Union Address, supra note 316.
461. Id.
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into their communities.462 It was designed to provide job training and
placement, transitional housing, and mentoring to non-violent offenders.463
The following year, DOL awarded thirty grants to faith-based and
community organizations to develop employment programs and support
services in other areas, including housing.464 However, the PRI grant
appropriation could not be used to provide direct financial housing
assistance.465 Instead, the expectation was that organizations would develop
networks with housing providers that would in turn provide the assistance.466
The interim report indicated that “[p]artnerships with housing providers that
would allow participants in need of housing to access such services were
generally not well developed.”467 DOL’s “Final Report” on the PRI included
housing outcomes, with staff citing “housing as the most significant obstacle
to reintegration.”468 As the Final Report explains,
[p]roject managers, case managers, and community justice
representatives were asked to identify the major challenges that exoffenders faced based on their experience in PRI and elsewhere.
Housing was cited most often by these three types of interviewees,
and substance abuse was the second most frequently mentioned
challenge.469
While criminal backgrounds and lack of funds contribute to the
difficulty of obtaining housing, Section 8 and public housing rules made the
top half of the list of reported housing barriers.470 In the end, the largest gap
in services was reported to be housing.471 The report was published in 2009,
twelve years ago as of the date of this writing.472 Little has changed.
The Obama Administration tackled criminal justice reform from the
outset, but it also touched national housing policy. As mentioned above, the
cabinets busily worked to deconstruct the lingering effects of the War on
Drug in the criminal context. The administration also quietly implemented
462. Id.
463. Oversight of Federal Assistance for Prisoner Rehabilitation and Reentry in our States:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Corr. and Rehab. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
75–78 (2006) (statement of Robert J. Bogart, Director, Center for Faith Based Community
Initiatives), http://archives.hud.gov/testimony/2006/test092106.cfm [hereinafter Statement of
Bogart].
464. HALL & KOLOVICH, supra note 17, at 1.
465. Id. at 10.
466. Id.; see also Statement of Bogart, supra note 463.
467. HALL & KOLOVICH, supra note 17, at 15.
468. Id. at xxvii–xxviii.
469. Id. at 52, 53 tbl IV.1.
470. Id. at 105, tbl IV.17.
471. Id. at 111, tbl IV.19.
472. See generally id.
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policies to reverse administrative practices in other areas influenced by the
War. For example, the cabinet-level Reentry Council was established during
Obama’s administration, with the purpose of assisting prisoners returning
home.473 The Council consisted of twenty federal agencies charged with the
administrative oversight and enforcement of legislation. 474 Along with DOJ
and DOL, HUD was part of the Council.
A review of housing rules also started to take shape under the Obama
Administration culminating in calls for PHAs to use their discretion to roll
back the harshness of the War’s exclusion policies. HUD Secretary Shaun
Donovan reminded PHAs in a 2011 letter that the Obama Administration
believed in second chances and explicitly encouraged PHAs “to allow exoffenders to rejoin their families in the Public Housing and Housing Choice
Voucher programs,” when appropriate.475 Recognizing that a substantial
number of new releasees intend to return to their families who may live in
federally-subsidized housing, the letter called for PHAs to balance family
reunification goals with the safety of housing residents.476 While the letter
from Secretary Donovan did not have the force of amending the anti-drug
federal housing statutes on the books, it did provide official executive support
to PHAs deviating from War calls to exclude whenever an option.
In 2016, HUD also issued PIH Notice 2015-19, which offered guidance
on the use of arrests to exclude households from federal housing programs.477
The notice concluded that an arrest alone is insufficient evidence of criminal
activity to evict or terminate a tenant, noting the Uniform Landlord Tenant
Act, which provides that evictions should be dismissed when the notice only
cites arrest as the basis for the eviction.478 The HUD notice warned that a
PHA’s notice of noncompliance based on an arrest alone would be legally
insufficient and result in dismissal. 479
HUD also noted that such practices might lead to concerns under the
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) in the form of discriminatory effects liability. 480
Although having a criminal history is not a protected trait, criminal records-

473. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL, supra note 455, at v.
474. Id.
475. HUD Letter Encourages Reuniting Ex-Offenders with Families without Compromising
Safety, THE RESIDENT NEWSLETTER (Pub. & Indian Hous. Info. Res. Ctr., Gambrills, MD), Aug.
2011, at 1. See also Donovan, supra note 395, at 1.
476. Donovan, supra note 395, at 1.
477. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. OFFICE OF PUB. & INDIAN HOUS., GUIDANCE FOR
PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF FEDERALLY-ASSISTED HOUSING ON
EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN HOUSING DECISIONS 3–4 (Nov. 2, 2015).
478. Id. at 3.
479. Id.
480. KANOVSKY, supra note 304, at 2.
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based exclusions violate the Act if a housing provider’s practice or policy has
an unjustified effect, even if the housing provider can show a valid interest
and there is no evidence of discriminatory intent.481 The fact that people of
color are arrested at disproportionate rates might create discriminatory effect
liability in certain areas. However, a statutory exemption, a relic from the
War, protects housing providers that exclude individuals convicted of one or
more enumerated drug crimes, regardless of the discriminatory effect.482
Nevertheless, the Act requires that the practice or policy serve a substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest to pass muster.483 With this, HUD
concluded that policies and practices that fail to consider the amount of time
that passed since the last incident of criminality would likely fall short of the
required threshold.484 Yet again, the HUD notice only carries the force of the
Administration’s political will without any real teeth or lasting impact.
Unlike the reform movement in the context of criminal law, national
housing policy continues to operate according to the rules and practices
established during the War. Congress has yet to revisit the legislation
imposing harsh consequences for suspicions of drug-related activity,
exclusions triggered by drug convictions, and terminations based on drug
abuse. Although HUD started to refocus housing policy towards a more
redemptive approach regarding drug offenders, the momentum died with the
presidential election of Donald Trump and the confirmation of Ben Carson
as HUD Secretary. The Trump administration’s focus was on the removal of
undocumented immigrants from federally subsidized housing programs.485
The courts, bound by the principle of administrative deference and HUD v.
Rucker, offer little relief from the War’s draconian regulations, leaving
returning prisoners and their families at the mercy of PHA discretion.
481. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2020); see also Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. v. Inclusive Comtys
Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 541 (2015) (explaining that housing providers may maintain a policy
that causes disparate impact “if they can prove it necessary to achieve a valid interest”). This
“unjustified” effect” occurs when the burden of the provider’s practice or policy falls more often on
housing market participants of one race or over another. Id. at 524.
482. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4). Section 807(b)(4) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits protection
against people for convictions concerning manufacture or distribution. Thus, a housing provider
will not be found liable for excluding individuals because they have been convicted of one or more
specific drug crimes, regardless of any discriminatory effect that may result. Id.
483. 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.500(b)(i)–(iii); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. at 541
(explaining that housing providers may maintain a policy that causes disparate impact “if they can
prove it necessary to achieve a valid interest”).
483. KANOVSKY, supra note 304, at 7.
484. Id.
485. Tracy Jan, HUD Secretary Ben Carson Defends Plan to Evict Undocumented Immigrants:
‘It’s not that we’re cruel, mean-hearted. It’s that we are logical.’, WASH. POST (May 21, 2019, 1:45
P.M. EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/05/21/house-democrats-grill-hudsecretary-ben-carson-plan-evict-undocumented-immigrants/.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article is meant as a call for a review of Wartime legislation and a
reform of national housing policy. For the past twenty years, all three
branches of government contributed to the reform movement in the criminal
law. Starting with the judicial branch, major pieces of anti-drug legislation
were dismantled, culminating in an era of redemption and second chances for
prisoners of the War. The contributions of Congress and the Executive
resulted in the development of release mechanisms to free drug prisoners
from the overly punitive sentences meted out during the War. Congress
amended the law while the Executive modified prosecutorial charging
practices and resurrected the presidential clemency power. However,
national housing policy remains a War stronghold.
If the political rhetoric of second chances and redemption is to be
offered as a truth, all areas of substantive of law affected by the policies of
the War on Drugs should be reviewed and modified. Housing policy must
consider the 600,000 people returning annually from America’s prisons and
jails and the recent legislation further opening the prison gates. Where will
they go? Because housing is understood to be the most difficult challenge in
the reentry process and is critical to post-incarceration stability, it is
imperative that federal housing legislation be immediately examined and
reformed as part of the current broader criminal reform.
While criminal law reform may have opened the door, the War’s
policies in other areas of law continue to keep prisoners excluded from
mainstream society. This in effect continues the War’s violence on targeted
groups. It is just that now it is socio-economic as opposed to criminal. Such
a schizophrenic policy sustains the revolving prison door. With the criminal
law reform movement serving as a model, it is clear that it will take all three
branches of government to participate in deconstructing the War’s influence
on national housing policy.
In his first 100 days, President Biden demonstrated an interest in
addressing the housing crisis. He is showing a promising commitment to
racial equality in housing and his administration is working to ensure the
rules reflect this.486 First, he appointed Marcia Fudge, an African American
lawyer, to the position of HUD Secretary.487 She immediately started the
rollback of Trump era policies and resurrecting the fair housing work of the
486. Tracy Jan, Trump Gutted Obama-era Housing Discrimination Rules. Biden’s Bringing
Them Back., WASH. POST (April 13, 2021, 6:39 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/uspolicy/2021/04/13/hud-biden-fair-housing-rules/.
487. Ebony Bowden, Joe Biden Chooses Ohio Rep. Marcia Fudge to be HUD secretary, NEW
YORK POST (December 8, 2020, 7:13 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/12/08/joe-biden-chooses-ohiorep-marcia-fudge-to-be-hud-secretary/.
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Obama Administration.488 In addition, in his proposed Infrastructure plan,
President Biden earmarked $213 billion to housing with $40 billion allocated
to updating and upgrading public housing and a promise to build 500,000
units for low-income families.489 With national attention now being paid to
the housing issue, now is the time to review and modify HUD rules that work
to exclude individuals with criminal histories. With funding available and
refreshed political will, we can begin thinking of new and innovative ways to
provide housing to this demographic.
Reentry, as a substantive area of law, is unique in its bipartisan
legislative support. While other areas of law experience severe partisan
divides, both sides of the aisle support reentry-centered initiatives and have
done so for the past twenty-five years. In addition to critically reviewing and
modifying legislation, a new legislative ideals should be developed that
reflect the second chance principle in the area of housing.
Courts should continue to examine subsidized housing rules with an eye
towards strictly enforcing constitutional due process requirements as well as
protecting Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and
seizure. The War is no longer an appropriate justification for a constitutional
exemption. While administrative deference is essential to the efficient
workings of government, constitutional protections and the principle of
fairness should be given full accord.
One a more local level, partnerships between local government,
community-based organizations, and private landlords should be explored
with a strong focus on geographic zones where most prisoners return.
Financial backing by local government may incentivize private landlords
typically renting in already depressed areas to loosen exclusionary policies.
Another suggestion is to create affordable residential units for short-term
stays for this group with strong ties to supportive services such as job training
and placement, vocational training, and counseling. Boots-on-the-ground
service providers should collaborate with government actors and the private
market to investigate ways to offer safe and affordable housing to those
returning home.
Policymakers and bureaucrats must understand that reentry is not
strictly a criminal law topic. It transcends the criminal law and penetrates
other areas such as housing, employment, public benefits. True reentry
requires a commitment to offer a second chance to prisoners in all aspects of
488. Jan, supra note 486.
489. Natalie Campisi, Bident’s Infrastructure Plan Earmarks $213 Billion for Housing. Here’s
He How He’d Spend It, FORBES ADVISOR (April 2, 2021, 4:59 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/mortgages/bidens-infrastructure-plan-earmarks-213-billion-forhousing-heres-how-hed-spend-it/.
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life. Opening the prison gates is the first step in the transition back home.
But to fully integrate the formerly incarcerated, we must open the door to
American life by offering real and equal socio-economic opportunity as well
embodying second chance ideologies in our day-to-day.
While benevolence and redemption are emerging as the signature creed
of recent criminal justice reform, zero-tolerance and harsh regulation
continue to dominate the underlying philosophy of other substantive areas of
law shaped by the War on Drugs. This in turn offers a duplicitous political
promise of a second chance. Thus, a second chance extends only as far as
the purpose of release from prison or relief from a criminal sentence. It no
longer applies once an individual walks across the threshold of the prison
gate back into free society. It is there that the opportunity for a real second
chance exists and, unfortunately, it is there that violence from the War
continues in the socio-economic realm of American life.

